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ZANITA E. FENTON*
Mirrored Silence: Reflections on
Judicial Complicity in Private
Violence
Tracy and John had been married for seven years. 1 They
were so in love when they met at college. He brought her flow-
ers and wanted to spend all of his free time with her. Every-
thing was perfect. But it seemed to become increasingly
tumultuous as soon as they got married, two years later. He
didn't just want to spend all of his time with her; he had to know
what she was doing every waking moment of the day. He had
to approve of her activities and her friends. He called her at
work every day. If she wasn't at her desk to answer the phone,
she had to account for her whereabouts. He became very de-
manding of her when she was in his presence and yelled at her
all the time. He hit her for the first time when she was pregnant
with their son. She covered the bruises and told no one. She
just couldn't believe the man that she loved and that was proud
to have sired a son had actually beat her. That was four years
ago. Now the way that he treats her is so regular, she no longer
believes he is the same man she married. She finally got the
courage to leave him. She filed for divorce and obtained a pro-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School; A.B.,
Princeton University, 1990; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1993. Research for this work
was funded by the Richard J. Barber Fund for Interdisciplinary Legal Research. For
faithfully reading and critiquing early versions of this paper, I thank my colleague
Jessica Litman. For providing feedback on my ideas and constructive criticism, I
also thank Martha Minow, Ronald Aronson, Janet Findlater, Kathryne Lindberg,
Frederica Lombard, Lawrence Mann, and Edward Wise. An early manifestation of
the section on Silence was presented to the 4th Annual Mid-Atlantic People of
Color Legal Scholarship Conference (1998) on Law and Literature. An early mani-
festation of the section on Breaking the Silence was presented at the 1998 Critical
Legal Studies Conference in Lancaster, England. I thank all of the participants of
these conferences who gave positive feedback and further direction for the final
development of this project.
I John Person was the defendant in People v. Person, 658 N.Y.S.2d 372 (1997).
His wife's name is never mentioned and is thus fictionalized in this account. In fact,
John was only named in the caption of the case. It is only clear from reading be-
tween the lines that the parties are married. Not naming the parties is perhaps what
enabled the judge to be detached from the factual situation.
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tective order, requiring him to leave the marital home. She
thought that if she could just get away from him for good every-
thing would be okay. They had split up before, but he had al-
ways come back, bearing gifts and veiled threats toward her or
to take her son away. She hoped this time would be different
because she had that protective order. But she knew he would
be angry; she was very afraid. Her fear was warranted. He
broke into the house, barricaded the door, and began to slap
her around. Over the years, he had learned how to hit in places
where there would be few or no marks. She scratched him on
the arm. He told her that she wasn't going anywhere and that
she would never leave him. In his rage, he screamed that every-
thing in the house was his and he'd take it away if he wanted to.
He grabbed her handbag and dumped the contents, stomping
on them as they fell to the ground. He grabbed the scissors off
the kitchen table and randomly started shredding things: her fa-
vorite armchair, some of her dresses from her closet. The police
arrived. A neighbor who knew about her protective order had
called them. The police took him away, but not before he told
her, "I'll be back.... "
T his is an imagined re-creation of what happened in the ap-
pellate case of People v. Person.2 It is an imagined recita-
tion of the facts because the only written opinion in the case did
not discuss the factual situation that gave rise to the case. On
the face of the opinion, one would not know it was a case of wife
abuse; it appears to concern only the proper application of the
law of criminal mischief involving the destruction of personal
property. Only by reading between the lines, noticing indications
that the defendant and the victim are married, references to
"physical injury," "unlawful imprisonment" and the damage to
personal property' would one have any idea that this was vio-
2 Id. (holding that without proof that property stolen or damaged was owned by
someone other than defendant, evidence is legally insufficient to sustain convictions
for criminal mischief, petit larceny, or burglary in the second degree). This Article
focuses on lower court opinions as these are the ones most directly affecting the lives
of individuals in domestic abuse situations. See Carolyn Heilbrun & Judith Resnik,
Convergences: Law, Literature, and Feminism, 99 YALE L.J. 1913, 1943 (1990) ("In-
stead of repeating some of the more cheery tales available by way of some Supreme
Court opinions (in some eras), why not try some of what goes on (not all of it tran-
scribed) in the lower courts, which are also places in which speakers of law display
their power?").
3 Silence, by its nature, is inherently difficult to document and discuss. See infra
Part I. In fact, the necessity of writing about silence and discussing theories of si-
lence are also forms of silence, not voicing the direct experiences of battered
women.
4 Batterers often terrorize their victims by threats, coercion and damage to their
personal property. DANIEL JAY SONKIN ET AL., THE MALE BATTERER: A TREAT-
MENT APPROACH 38 (1985); Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal
[Vol. 78, 1999]
Mirrored Silence
lence against a spouse. In Person, the court concluded that there
can be no criminal mischief where the defendant holds an equita-
ble interest in the property at issue and relied on marital status to
establish such an interest. It did not even mention the physical
abuse in the same set of facts for which the defendant was
charged with criminal mischief, because it did not find it relevant.
For this court, the salient consideration was whether the defend-
ant could claim an interest in the property in question.
By the court's reasoning, because the defendant was married
to the alleged property owner, he held an equitable interest in
her property and could not be found guilty of criminal mischief.
This means that, because of marital status, a husband could not
be held responsible for the destruction of his wife's property,
even when such destruction was a means of terrorizing her. In-
sisting that the husband has an equitable interest in his wife's
property, which allows him to destroy it with impunity, effec-
tively extinguishes the wife's rights in such property as against
the husband, and thereby perpetuates the power imbalance of
patriarchal family structure.5 This reasoning affirms the hus-
band's dominant role within the family6 and continues the spirit
Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 801, 872 (1993); Victoria L. Lutz & Cara M. Bonomolo, My Husband
Just Trashed Our Home; What Do You Mean That's Not a Crime?, 48 S.C. L. REV.
641 (1997); Victoria L. Lutz & William R. Slye, Where Criminal Mischief is Not a
Crime, 3 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REP. 30 (Dec./Jan. 1998).
5 The terms "patriarchy" and "patriarchal" are used throughout this Article. Pa-
triarchy is not easily defined as it is a term precipitating much controversy and con-
fusion. Literally, it means "rule by fathers." Colloquially, many find it to be
pejorative in that it may be viewed as accusatory to men. The use of the term here is
intended in its descriptive and academic use to explain current legal and social struc-
tures for the purpose of change. Academically, there is also much disagreement as
to its origins and use. Carole Pateman gives an accurate historical account of the
term's use and origins. She describes three forms of patriarchal thought: traditional,
classical, and modern. The traditional form is based on the authority of the father as
head of the family and provides the metaphor for power and authority relations.
The classical, based on the position of Sir Robert Filmer, claims that the paternal
and political power are not merely analogous, but identical. The modern form is a
combination, confusion, and conflation of the traditional and classical forms. CAR-
OLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 19-38 (1988). Theories in this Article may
fairly be characterized as a discussion of the modern form of patriarchy.
6 Robin West, in her incisive critique of modern jurisprudence using a "separation
thesis," that each human being is "physically separate from all other human beings,"
demonstrates how the law's approach to life is "irretrievably masculine" because it is
based on the premise that human beings are separate and distinct. She also demon-
strates that a "connection thesis," whereby human beings are essentially connected,
manifest in women's lives literally through heterosexual intercourse, pregnancy, and
breast feeding. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988)
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of coverture long after its formal abandonment.7 Where the
court was quite creative in finding that marriage confers an equi-
table interest for purposes of the criminal mischief statute,8 it just
as easily could have considered how marriage can become an in-
strument of terror, aggravating rather than diminishing the sever-
ity of the alleged offense for which the defendant was charged.
The formalistic approach taken by the Person court does jus-
tice a disservice. This approach, treating the parties as abstrac-
tions and entirely omitting context, allows the court to distance
itself from moral responsibility for the violence it ultimately con-
dones or authorizes.9 Adjudicating a controversy between living
human beings requires personal investment in the decision and
moral responsibility for the outcome. When judges distance
themselves from the substance of the case, this inhibits the devel-
opment of legal rules suited to human situations to which they
apply. At best, the judges in Person acted out of lack of concern
for the effect of their decision, or possibly on the premise that it
was someone else's job to deal with the terrorism inherent in the
crime charged in this case.
The Person opinion supports and perpetuates the power dy-
namic of the silencing force of patriarchy.' ° Indeed, as already
(noting that by blindly enforcing patriarchal structures, the court protects male in-
terests and male autonomy of action while obscuring the woman's interests in indi-
viduation and a woman's right to be free from terror).
7 See Reva B. Siegel, Home As Work: The First Woman's Rights Claims Concern-
ing Wives' Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073 (1994) [hereinafter
Home as Work] (examining the efforts of the nineteenth-century woman's rights
movement to reform the doctrine of marital service); Reva B. Siegel, The Moderni-
zation of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives' Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82
GEO. L.J. 2127 (1994) [hereinafter Marital Status Law] (pointing out that the nine-
teenth-century married women's property acts and earnings statutes did not fully
emancipate wives from the common law of marital status).
8 The Person court relied on the definition of marital property in reaching this
conclusion. Lutz & Slye demonstrate that the authorities cited in Person do not sup-
port its conclusions and furthermore are at odds with the State of New York's prece-
dents. Lutz & Slye, supra note 4, at 17-18, 30 (citing Whiton v. Snyder, 88 N.Y. 299,
304 (1882); People v. Morton, 123 N.E.2d 790 (N.Y. 1954); Young v. Seckler, 426
N.Y.S.2d 311 (1980); Manheim v. Manheim, 302 N.Y.S.2d 473 (1969), aff'd, 310
N.Y.S.2d 1017 (1970); Kroul v. Kroul, 344 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1973); Goldberg v.
Goldberg, 531 N.Y.S.2d 318 (1988)).
9 Patricia M. Wald, Violence Under the Law: A Judge's Perspective, in LAw's Vio-
LENCE 77, 81-83 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992) (discussing how fed-
eral sentencing guidelines eliminate the judge's discretion and thus the personal
involvement in moral decisions).
10 Of course, the nature of patriarchy has changed over the years, in form more so
than in substance. Reva Siegel calls a change in rules and rhetoric of a status regime
[Vol. 78, 1999]
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indicated, the court's holding is reminiscent of nothing so much
as coverture. Coverture was the explicit legal erasure of the
rights of married women."t We cannot consider the inequities of
coverture to have been abandoned as long as the law continues
to treat women as subservient to the whims of their husbands, as
the Person decision does. Silence surrounding wife beating, es-
pecially silence perpetuated in judicial opinions, allows the per-
petuation of the patriarchal structure embodied in the old
doctrine of coverture."2 Judges who do not address the full fac-
tual situation and narrate the stories behind the application of
the law erase women by not adequately providing a voice and
legal protection for them.
Formalism, in the sense of excessive adherence to abstract
rules of law at the expense of substance and particularity, is a
form of silence. The Person court discussed the law, reciting only
the sparsest of facts necessary to support the chosen outcome.
When only the facts required to support a given outcome are dis-
cussed, the avoidance of uncomfortable or ill-fitting facts makes
it difficult to say that justice has, in fact, been done. 3 Such an
"preservation through transformation." Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife
Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2119 (1996).
Though not often discussed or acknowledged, patriarchy, as a system of power,
has an intrinsic role in the nature of racism. See DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE
BLACK BODY (1997) (discussing the rhetoric and politics used to degrade black wo-
men's reproductive choices); Zanita E. Fenton, Domestic Violence in Black and
White: Racialized Gender Stereotypes in Gender Violence, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
1 (1998) (discussing the relationship between racism and sexism in forming stereo-
types that condition violence); Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the
Meaning of Motherhood, 1 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 1, 3 (1993) ("[Racism and patri-
archy] are two interrelated, mutually supporting systems of domination and their
relationship is essential to understanding the subordination of all women."). In ad-
dition, slavery had an influence on the nature of patriarchy and the modern Ameri-
can family, if for no other reason than the plantation was structured around an
extended family model. In addition, the nature of patriarchy in the American black
family originated from the influences of slavery. See HERBERT G. GUTMAN, THE
BLACK FAMILY IN SLAVERY AND FREEDOM 1750-1925, at 31 (1976) ("How slaves
learned and whom they learned from always affected what they believed and there-
fore how they behaved and the choices they made.").
I1 See Home as Work, supra note 7; Marital Status Law, supra note 7; Siegel,
supra note 10; see also Lutz & Slye, supra note 4, at 31. This is also in direct contra-
vention of the Married Women's Property Act of 1848 in New York, repudiating
many of the vestiges of coverture. See id. at 17-18 (citing People v. Morton, 123
N.E.2d 790 (N.Y. 1954)).
12 See infra Part I.A.
13 For example, in the case of DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1990), the Court found that the Winnebago County Social
Services Department did not violate the constitutional rights of Joshua DeShaney
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approach proceeds backward: the law appropriate for the actual
facts ought to be found, rather than limiting the narrated facts to
those that neatly fit the most crabbed interpretation of existing
law.
Even though the criminal law is largely a statutory scheme, this
does not relieve courts from the duty to ensure justice. When a
situation is novel or poorly fits the paradigm underlying an ex-
isting rule of law, the ill-fit ought to be elaborated so that appro-
priate new law can be developed.14 The courts play a crucial role
in demonstrating injustices in the law's application and its inade-
quacies, thereby making it possible for the law to approximate
more closely true justice.15 Omission of the full story, the full set
when it failed to protect him from the violence of his father. In his dissent, Justice
Blackmun accused the majority of retreating "into a sterile formalism" preventing it
from recognizing either the facts of the case before it, or the legal norms that should
apply to those facts. See also Wald, supra note 9, at 97-96; Martha Minow, Words
and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and Family Violence, 43
VAND. L. REV. 1665 (1990). It is instructive to consider the continuum of silence
between the "mere manipulations" of existing law to achieve a preferred outcome
and outright omission of the facts preventing their consideration. Of course, both
are a means of preventing the development of canon and new doctrine. See ROB-
ERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 201-
25 (1975).
14 There need not be a different law for every unique situation, but one narrow
enough to apply in like situations in a similar area, such as domestic violence. The ill
fit of violence against women in the home to the existing legal structures is, in part,
produced by activists' reform efforts directed at a statutory criminal law system,
rather than at effecting the formation of a separate doctrinal area within. See Eliza-
beth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Wo-
men's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1986) (demonstrating the connection
between political action, the formation of cognizable rights, and reform for women).
An example of political action is the development of shelters in the mid 1970s, which
helped force the issues affecting battered women into the public consciousness. See
Jeffrey Fagan, Cessation of Family Violence: Deterrence and Dissuasion, in FAMILY
VIOLENCE 377, 391 (Lloyd Ohlin & Michael Tonry eds., 1989) ("[W]omen's shelters
effectively communicated societal rejection of battering; shelters create alternatives
for women to remaining in violent homes and may neutralize male dominance and
control that typifies violence toward wives." (citation omitted)); Susan Schechter,
Building Bridges Between Activists, Professionals, and Researchers, in FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE 299 (Kersti Y116 & Michele Bograd eds., 1988)
[hereinafter FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES]. Discussions with feminists, active in the early
years of the Battered Women's movement, suggest that there were many reserva-
tions about using the criminal justice system as a component in eliminating the vio-
lence against women, for precisely the reason that it was institutionally patriarchal.
15 See Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709 (1998)
(arguing that one role of the judiciary is to point out inadequacies in the law). But
see Abner J. Mikva, Why Judges Should Not Be Advicegivers: A Response to Profes-
sor Neal Katyal, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1825 (1998). See also 1 WAYNE R. LA FAVE &
AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 2.1(a), at 89 (1986 & Supp.
1000 [Vol. 78, 1999]
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of facts, evades justice rather than supports it and erases the
voices of human beings, both victims and perpetrators, for whom
our system of justice is established. It ignores the perspective of
the concrete individuals who are the ultimate "consumers of
justice."16
Person need not have been decided in the manner it was. Peo-
ple v. Kheyfets 7 is a similar case involving a situation of violence
within a marriage where the husband not only physically as-
saulted his wife, but also destroyed her personal property in or-
der to terrorize her. In an effort to indicate that he only
reluctantly followed interpretation of the criminal mischief stat-
ute by the higher court in Person, trial Judge Leventhal set out
the facts of Kheyfets at length in order to demonstrate the ineq-
uity of applying the precedent established by Person to those
facts:
The charges against the defendant arose out of two incidents.
On January 14, 1997, the defendant, who had been drinking,
allegedly started a fight with the complainant in their home
between midnight and 1 o'clock. According to the complain-
ant, the defendant called her names and attempted to get her
to come to bed. When she refused, he hit and kicked her in
the stomach and ripped off her blouse. The complainant yel-
led for help and the defendant turned up the volume of the
television. The defendant then allegedly ripped the phone out
of the socket, breaking it, because the complainant wanted to
call the police. She continued to yell for help while the de-
fendant kicked her arms and hit her breast, nose and lips,
causing her nose to swell and her lips to bleed. Eventually the
superintendent of the building and the police arrived. As a
result of the incident, the complainant had black and blue
marks, had difficulty eating and breathing, and took Tylenol
for her pain....
On April 18, 1997, the defendant, who had been drinking,
allegedly began a fight with the complainant at their home.
According to the complainant, the defendant wanted her to go
to bed with him and when she refused he twisted her arm,
ripped her watch off, breaking it, and began calling her names.
The defendant pulled the phone out of the socket, breaking it,
1999) ("[lI]t is hard for the legislature in advance to conceive of all possible anti-
social behavior that ought to be criminal.").
16 Edmond Cahn, The Consumers of Injustice, in CONFRONTING INJUSTICE: THE
EDMOND CAHN READER 5 (Lenore L. Cahn ed., 1962) (explaining that Cahn op-
posed the tendency of lawyers and legal philosophers to overemphasize concepts
and abstractions, insisting that the purpose of law was to satisfy the needs of actual
human beings in concrete processes).
17 665 N.Y.S.2d 802 (1997).
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because the complainant wanted to call the police or his fa-
ther. The defendant then picked up a knife, telling the com-
plainant he would not hurt her. He yelled at her and then hit
her in the stomach with his fist. The defendant waved the
knife around and cut the complainant's forehead, causing it to
swell and bleed. As the complainant tended to her injury, the
defendant "tried to be nice." The complainant then went
shopping in order to get out of the house. The defendant later
caught up with her in the lobby and started dragging her by
the jacket while calling her names. The complainant
screamed, causing neighbors to summon the police.
18
After this recital of events, Justice Leventhal proceeded to
demonstrate that the phrase "money of another" in the criminal
mischief statute could have been interpreted differently, pointing
out that the formalistic approach taken by the court in Person
was not inevitable, but rather a choice substantially dictated by
the omission of context.' 9 Judge Leventhal pointed out that the
Supreme Court of the United States had invalidated a state stat-
ute that gave a husband, as "head and master" of property jointly
owned with his wife, the unilateral right to dispose of such prop-
erty without the wife's consent.2" He also pointed out that other
jurisdictions do not hold that one spouse can destroy the prop-
erty of the other with impunity just because he or she may have
an ownership interest in it; these other jurisdictions recognize
that "batterers often damage property to terrorize, threaten and
exert control over victims of domestic violence."2 1 With the full
set of facts juxtaposed to the application of law, the inequities in
domestic abuse become readily apparent. These exposed inequi-
ties provide powerful justification for the judiciary to fashion bet-
ter remedies within the current law and provide incentive for the
legislature to amend the laws to combat these social ills.22 Thus,
18 Id. at 803.
19 Id. at 804-05; see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 145.00 (McKinney 1999). Judge
Leventhal chose to consider New York's arson and larceny statutes to understand
"property of another" under the criminal mischief statute rather than importing
property concepts from Domestic Relations Law, which generally are not recog-
nized under penal laws. See Lutz & Slye, supra note 4, at 18.
20 Kheyfets, 665 N.Y.S.2d at 805. In Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981).
the Court held a now superseded Louisiana marital property statute in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A husband's ability to
dispose of jointly held property is, in the least, analogous to a husband's right to
destroy property in which he has merely an equitable interest,
21 Kheyfets, 665 N.Y.S.2d at 804.
22 It may be concluded from this Article that the judiciary make law, which is a
legislative function. Though it is neither novel nor unprecedented, this is not the
essence of the argument presented here. The judiciary must render its opinions in
[Vol. 78, 1999]1002
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despite the strictures of a statutory system a new doctrinal area
might have the opportunity to develop.
Aiming to reform the legal system, as opposed to forming it
anew, more readily permits biases in the system to remain. Of
course, activists who seek to prevent actual ongoing violence
against women will try to fit their claims into the system as it
exists. This approach may yield successful results. This necessar-
ily involves, however, resorting to a system that still incorporates
patriarchal categories and processes,23 and such categories and
processes are themselves tools of oppression insofar as they de-
fine too narrowly what will and will not "count" as wrongs and
how they are committed.
For example, it is not hard to envision the underlying picture
upon which the law of battery is predicated. Say "battery," and
we most likely imagine a street fight or a barroom brawl or per-
haps even a duel.24  A prolonged continuation of events and
accordance with substantive considerations as dictated by the full set of facts. In
addition, this Article does not suggest exception to the due process requirement of
certainty in the law, nullum crimen lege, but does maintain that the judiciary is in the
best position to point out gaps in the law through their opinions to the legislatures.
For sources discussing the possibility of cooperation between the legislature and ju-
diciary in forming law see Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185 (1992); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, A Plea for Legislative Review,
60 S. CAL. L. REV. 995 (1987); Deanell Reece Tacha, Judges and Legislators: En-
hancing the Relationship, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1537 (1995). For sources discussing the
judiciary's role in making law see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962); GUIDO CALA-
BRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); Christopher F. Edley,
Jr., The Governance Crisis, Legal Theory, and Political Ideology, 1991 DUKE L.J.
561; Katyal, supra note 15. But see Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Constitutional
Flares: On Judges, Legislatures, and Dialogue, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1998); Mikva,
supra note 15; Patricia M. Wald, The "New Administrative Law"-With the Same
Old Judges In It?, 1991 DUKE L.J. 647 (1991).
23 See Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the
Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886 (1989) (discuss-
ing how the language of law is gendered male); see also Elizabeth M. Schneider,
Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623 (1980) (examining how sexual stereotypes of women and the
male orientation are built into the law and legal system and how the assertions of
self-defense by battered women are not requests for special treatment, but pleas for
equal treatment).
24 See Leslie Bender, Teaching Torts as if Gender Matters: Intentional Torts, 2 VA.
J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 115, 127 (1994) (pointing out that the "classic bar room fight" or
"fistfight serving as the classic example of battery" is a gendered notion itself). It
should be no surprise that the law does not contemplate situations of women's vic-
timization. Historically, women had no input in the formation of the law. See LAW-
RENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 215 (1993)
("Men who beat women, who harassed them, who raped them, were arrested by
1003
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strong relationship ties are not contemplated.25 Thus, rules
about when self-defense against a battery is permitted contem-
plates the need for immediate action in response to sudden
threatened aggression by a stranger. Battered Woman Syndrome
has been a reform effort to include other situations within the
ambit of self-defense law.26 There has been resistance to this ex-
pansion however.2 7 Indeed, the development of Battered Wo-
man Syndrome has been as much a struggle against the standard
conception of battery as it is a demonstration of the need for new
approaches in this specific area of law.
The objective of this Article is to advocate the following con-
clusions regarding the development of appropriate new canons
for domestic abuse. More than written laws must be changed if
victims of domestic abuse are to be better protected.28 First, the
stories of abuse must be told in an authoritative public forum:
court opinions. Narrating the full facts is an indispensable pre-
requisite if change is to be effectuated and a new ethos evolved.
Second, judicial interpretation of the law must include an elabo-
ration of the inadequacies of existing rules. In this way, there is a
greater potential for injustice to be better exposed and new rules
designed to prevent such injustice. Third, remedies and/or pun-
ishments appropriate for abusive situations and designed to allow
the victims an escape from the violence must be fashioned, rather
than allowing the continuation of a situation which leaves the vic-
men; tried by men, sentenced by men, and in many ways, the system looked at the
whole process through men's eyes, using men's standards and men's
consciousness.").
25 See Donna Meredith Matthews, Making the Crucial Connection: A Proposed
Threat Hearsay Exception, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 117, 159-64 (1997) (arguing
for an exception to the hearsay rules in cases of domestic homicide to allow the
court to hear about the victim's fears); Myrna S. Raeder, The Admissibility of Prior
Acts of Domestic Violence: Simpson and Beyond, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1463, 1512-16
(1996) (arguing that rules of evidence which exclude prior acts of domestic abuse in
homicide trials are gender-biased); Myrna S. Raeder, The Double-Edged Sword: Ad-
missibility of Battered Woman Syndrome By and Against Batterers in Cases Implicat-
ing Domestic Violence, 67 U. CoLo. L. REV. 789 (1996) (suggesting that background
evidence of domestic violence should be given to jurors so they may determine its
significance).
26 See infra text accompanying notes 90-94.
27 See generally Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and
Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379 (1991).
28 See Home as Work, supra note 7; Marital Status Law, supra note 7; Siegel,
supra note 10, at 2121-41; see also JAMES PTACEK, BATTERED WOMEN IN THE
COURTROOM: THE POWER OF JUDICIAL RESPONSES (1999) (examining the ways in




tim exposed to violence, and possibly to an increased level of
violence.
Part I of this Article describes the pervasive silence surround-
ing issues of domestic violence as well as the systemic nature of
such silence. It specifically discusses the role of patriarchy in
maintaining this silence and the judiciary's complicity in perpetu-
ating the patriarchal structure and silence that surrounds it. Part
II discusses the nature of violence and its role in creating and
enforcing silence. It concludes with a discussion of the concepts
of legitimacy and its relationship to political authority in the
wielding and control of violence. Part III explores how the judi-
ciary, through its authority, can assume a vital role in eliminating
silence, and thereby better prevent violence by providing written
accounts of the forms that violence takes. This part considers the
relationship between law and literature and the useful lessons
that may be learned from literature. Finally, Part IV discusses
potential alternative remedies that might be employed by the
courts in an effort to better protect the victims of domestic abuse.
I
SILENCE
In domestic abuse,2 9 silence begins with the victim. 30 The vic-
29 The context in which this Article explores these omissions, both in the text and
in the discussion of the text, is violence against women in the home, or also referred
to as woman battering or wife abuse. Woman battering is defined as violence by an
adult male intimate against an adult female intimate, regardless of marital status of
living arrangements. This Article focuses on male violence because men are the
abusers and women the victims in the vast number of cases treated by public author-
ities, shelters, and counseling programs. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
FACTBOOK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE BY INTIMATES 4 (Mar. 1998) [herein-
after VIOLENCE BY INTIMATES] ("Although less likely than males to experience vio-
lent crime overall, females are 5 to 8 times more likely than males to be victimized
by an intimate."); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL
REPORT, SEX DIFFERENCES IN VIOLENT VICTIMIZATION, 1994, at 4 (Sept. 1997)
("For male victims a stranger committed a majority of victimizations (63%), while a
nonstranger committed 37% .... For female victims the distribution was reversed.
The offender was most often someone known to them (62%). A stranger committed
38% of the violence against females."); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: ESTIMATES FROM THE
REDESIGNED SURVEY 1, 3 (Aug. 1995) (reporting that while men are about twice as
likely as women to experience acts of violence by strangers, women are about six
times more likely than men to experience violence committed by an intimate); Bu-
REAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE: SELECTED FINDINGS, VIO-
LENT CRIME 2 (Apr. 1994) (reporting that "[a] third of all violent victimizations of
women but a twentieth of all violent victimizations of men are committed by a rela-
tive or intimate").
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In this discussion of "private" violence, the terms wife-beating, wife abuse, domes-
tic violence or abuse, relationship violence, and intimate violence are more or less
used interchangeably. The first three are most accurately situated in theories of pa-
triarchal silence. The second and third also most accurately describe the preponder-
ance of these experiences. Domestic violence and abuse are more inclusive of
violence within all family relationships, such as child abuse, sibling abuse, and elder
abuse. The last two terms are intended to be inclusive of the violence that occurs
outside the formal bonds of marriage. These terms are used interchangeably in part
to achieve some ambiguity and broad applicability outside normative expectations
and to garner the wisdom of a broad range of literature.
The use of the term "battered woman" is avoided because, as Martha Mahoney
points out, it "focuses on the woman in a violent relationship rather than the man or
the battering process, it creates a tendency to see the woman as the problem."
Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining The Issue of Sep-
aration, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 25 (1991) [hereinafter Separation]; see also Liz Kelly,
How Women Define Their Experiences of Violence, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 14, at 114; Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Chal-
lenges of Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 520, 530-31, 535 (1992) (preferring the phrase, "a woman who has (or had) a
relationship with a battering man"). In the context of this discussion, even this sub-
tle example of the woman as the problem contributes to the erasure of her voice
from the solution. Similarly, victims of abuse often resist use of the term "batterer"
to define their loved one, life partner, and perhaps, father to their children. See
Martha R. Mahoney, Victimization or Oppression: Women's Lives, Violence and
Agency, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE 59, 75 (Martha Albertson
Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994) [hereinafter Women's Lives]; see also
Evan Stark & Anne H. Flitcraft, Women and Children at Risk: A Feminist Perspec-
tive on Child Abuse, 18 INT'L J. HEALTH SERVICES, 97 (1988) (viewing child abuse
through the prism of woman battering and positing that the best way to prevent
child abuse is through female empowerment).
The phrase "wife abuse" is used specifically to situate the discussion in the context
of marriage. Marriage is integral to our conceptualizations of gender relations and
intimate violence. I do not mean to exclude forms of intimate violence outside of
institutional marriage. Understanding that most intimate abuse revolves around the
conceptualization of marriage, regardless of marital status, I believe it more fruitful
to closely explore the marriage model in developing theory. See Michele Bograd,
Feminist Perspectives on Wife Abuse: An Introduction, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 14, at 12 ("As feminists, we believe that the social institutions of mar-
riage and family are special contexts that may promote, maintain, and even support
men's use of physical force against women.").
Rape must be included in the definition of abuse. Therefore, literature concern-
ing rape is also relied upon. See, e.g., DAVID FINKELHOR & KERSTI YLLO. LICENSE
TO RAPE: SEXUAL ABUSE OF WIVES 37 (1985) ("[B]attered women are at high risk
for marital rape. The kind of man who beats his wife is also more likely to rape
her."); DIANA E. H. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE (1990) (discussing the relation-
ship between rape and physical abuse and the nature of power and control within
patriarchal relationships).
30 See Sharon Wofford Mihalic & Delbert Elliot, If Violence is Domestic, Does it
Really Count?, 12 J. FAMILY VIOLENCE 293, 306 (1997) (indicating that "from 67%
and 83% of all marital violence assaults, both minor and serious, reported in the
marital violence section are not reported in the crime section"); Stephen J.
Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 2152, 2156
(1995) (citing S. REP. No. 102-197, at 38 (1991)); see also Linda G. Mills, On the
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tim is silent to avoid the rebuke of family and friends who place
blame for her troubles on the victim, is silent to avoid or lessen
the retribution exacted from the abuser for revealing his actions,
is silent to shield her children from the hurt that comes from the
abuse of one parent by the other, and is silent to avoid her own
sense of shame in not meeting the expected image of the perfect
wife or mother. Some scholars estimate that perhaps fifty per-
cent or more of all women will be victims of battering during
their lifetimes,3" and statistics suggest that twenty-nine percent of
violence against women is committed by a lone offender, where
the perpetrator was a husband, ex-husband, boyfriend or ex-boy-
friend.32 Yet, under-reporting by the victim is widely acknowl-
edged.33 Though the victim does not actively create the situation
of abuse, she internalizes the blame. This dynamic is reinforced
by the fact that one of the first questions asked of the victim is
"why doesn't she leave?," placing responsibility for the situation
on her.34
It is the abuser who forces the silence. Domestic abuse is a
means of obtaining control. Control over another person's ac-
tions, activities, and whereabouts to the extent of controlling
their identity is the ultimate in silencing. That such control is
obtained by actual force and the threat of actual force adds to the
debased nature of the erasure. Though the abuser should be
ashamed of his actions, control of the relationship means that his
shame is transferred to the victim. He removes himself from re-
sponsibility by externalizing his shame to the victim. 35 The con-
Other Side of Silence: Affective Lawyering for Intimate Abuse, 81 CORNELL L. REV.
1225 (1996) (discussing ways for attorneys to better serve their clients who are other-
wise silenced).
Even though we might say that silence begins with the victim, it is important to
note that silence is a public construction of audible accounts as private, i.e., not
worth listening to by public authorities.
31 See SONKIN ET AL., supra note 4, at xi; LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED
WOMAN ix (1980); Christine A. Littleton, Women's Experience and the Problem of
Transition: Perspectives on Male Battering of Women, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23, 27-
28 n.19; Separation, supra note 29, at 10-11.
32 R. EMERSON DOBASH & RUSSELL DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES: A
CASE AGAINST THE PATRIARCHY 3 (1979).
33 Id. at 164-67; Mihalic & Elliot, supra note 30, at 293 (discussing how under-
reporting of domestic abuse is due in great measure to the respondents' unwilling-
ness to characterize intimate violence as criminal).
34 See Separation, supra note 29, at 61-65; see also Barbara Hart, Battered Women
and the Criminal Justice System, 36 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 624, 626-27 (1993)
(discussing blaming attitudes towards victims).
35 It is not uncommon for the batterer to blame his victim for his own violence
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trolling nature of this violence is exemplified by the fact that the
point of separation, when the victim chooses to leave and reclaim
a separate identity, is when there is the potential for the greatest
harm. 6
Social mores present the structure permitting the silence. Pop-
ular images in the media also create forms of silence.3 7 The si-
lences include ignoring the existence of abuse in the home, its
issues and problems, and minimizing its occurrence and effects.
Our preferred community image dictates that we treat domestic
abuse as aberrant, not something into which society need put a
lot of energy. In fact, lack of public resources for shelters, safe
havens, counseling or other means of helping a victim end or
move away from the violence limits the victim's ability to reclaim
her identity and thus contributes to her silencing. Where re-
sources or help might be found, the silence is institutionalized.
The medical profession, for example, has been criticized for not
properly diagnosing and treating victims of abuse.38
and abuse. His rationale for his behavior is that she precipitated or deserved it and
therefore he is not at fault. See WALKER, supra note 31, at 165-84.
36 See Separation, supra note 29, at 6 ("Separation assault is the common though
invisible thread that unites the equal protection suits on enforcement of temporary
restraining orders, the cases with dead women that appear in many doctrinal catego-
ries, and the cases with dead men-the self-defense cases." (citation omitted)).
37 See MARIAN MEYERS, NEWS COVERAGE OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: EN-
GENDERING BLAME ix (1997) [hereinafter NEWS COVERAGE] ("The predominant
problems with news about violent crime against women-such as blaming the victim
and reinforcing harmful cultural stereotypes and myths-lie not with individual
journalists but with the social structures and values that deny male violence against
women in a serious, systemic problem rooted in misogyny and patriarchy."); Mia
Consalvo, "3 Shot Dead in Courthouse": Examining News Coverage of Domestic Vi-
olence and Mail-Order Brides, 21 WOMEN'S STUD. IN COMM. 188, 207 (1998) (point-
ing out that dominant views about domestic violence in the news include: "[T]hat
men who batter are deviant or sick; that only some victims are innocent; that the
woman is often blamed for what happened to her-and the issue of domestic vio-
lence itself [is] often erased from the coverage."); Marian Meyers, News of Bat-
tering, 44 J. COMM. 47, 48 (1994) [hereinafter News of Battering] ("[T]he news works
ideologically to support the dominant power structure by creating a consensus that
appears grounded in everyday reality."). Shows such as "Cops", while striving for
the quality of reality, omit the voice of the victim, and even the batterer, in portray-
als of domestic abuse. See id. at 69.
38 Moreover, . . . institutions like the medical and other helping professions
(such as the police and the judiciary) are complicit, or at least congruent,
with "the social construction of battering." For example, a study by Stark,
Flitecraft, and Frazier (1979) of how the emergency room of a city hospital
treated women for injuries or symptoms while completely ignoring the
causes, if the injuries resulted from battering, shows how the institution of
medicine "coerce[s] women who are appealing for help back into the situa-
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Even though there have been a wide range of reforms over the
last twenty-five years,39 state and legal actors continue to become
complicit in the silence early. Preferences by individual actors
within the chain of justice, including judges, to treat domestic vi-
olence as a private matter or to ignore it whenever it does not
meet their perceived threshold level of violence,4" diminishes its
import and marginalizes the needs of the victims. The police have
tions and relationships that batter them. It shows a system taking women
who were hit, and turning them into battered women."
Teresa de Laurentis, The Violence of Rhetoric: Considerations on Representation and
Gender, in THE VIOLENCE OF REPRESENTATION 239, 241 (Nancy Armstrong & Leo-
nard Tennenhouse eds., 1989) (alteration in original) (citation omitted); see also
Frances L. Restuccia, Literary Representations of Battered Women: Spectacular Do-
mestic Punishment, in BODIES OF WRITING, BODIES IN PERFORMANCE 42 (Thomas
Foster et al. eds., 1996) (discussing a commentary on "the institutional complicity in
battering of medical and other 'helping professions (such as the police and the judi-
ciary"')); Minow, supra note 13, at 1668-72 (discussing how different actors contrib-
ute to the perpetuation of the violence).
39 See, e.g., Angela Corsilles, No-Drop Policies in the Prosecution of Domestic Vi-
olence Cases: Guarantee to Action or Dangerous Solution?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV.
853 (1994); Donna M. Welch, Mandatory Arrest of Domestic Abusers: Panacea or
Perpetuation of the Problem of Abuse?, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 1133 (1994) (presenting
a nuanced analysis of a complex problem); see also recent legislation to provide civil
remedies in federal court for gender-based violence, 1994 Violence Against Women
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994), and proposed legislation to provide greater funding
and programs to stop domestic abuse, Violence Against Women Act II, H.R. REP.
No. 106-357 (1999) and S. REP. No. 106-51 (1999), and proposed legislation to in-
crease protections against hate crimes including those against women, Hate Crimes
Prevention Act of 1999, H.R. REP. 106-1082 (1999) and S. REP. No. 106-622 (1999).
The reforms that have addressed some problems endemic to domestic abuse are to
be applauded. In fact, the discussions which are the subject of this Article could not
have existed without the work of women's movements and the acceptance of such
reforms. Such reforms were a necessary response to the silences and attempt to
facilitate the law's responses to them. Nonetheless, reforms themselves have a qual-
ity of silencing. When people believe something is being done, they often do not
feel the need to do more or go further. The reforms to date can only be considered
the beginning as they have not been transformative, perhaps because they were initi-
ated from without. We need to go further in addressing the issues of domestic
abuse. Attempting to fill the silences from within the system is the next place to
start.
40 In the 1970s and early 1980s, there was considerable academic disagreement as
to what constituted "violence." See, e.g., MURRAY A. STRAUS ET AL., BEHIND
CLOSED DOORS 20-22 (1981) (discussing the differences between "normal violence"
and "abusive violence"). Currently, there is more academic agreement that violence
and abuse ranges from the emotional or psychological to the physical. See Gerald T.
Hotaling et al., Intrafamily Violence, and Crime and Violence Outside the Family, in
FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 14, at 315, 319-27 (discussing the expansion of the
definition of family violence). Nevertheless, old perceptions continue and individu-
als may disagree as to what constitutes violence and abuse. These differences can be
considered to be modes of resistance and additional means of silencing.
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a long history of ignoring, and in some instances, facilitating do-
mestic abuse.4 Prosecutors have a history of selective prosecu-
tion and choices in plea bargaining favorable to the batterer
42
that may provide incentives for recidivism,43 in some instances
prosecuting the abuser only after a murder has occurred.' In ad-
dition to literal inattention, issues of domestic abuse are silenced
when they are not identified as such, but categorically atomized
and treated in several different doctrinal areas.45 The diffuse
treatment functions to dilute the magnitude and seriousness of
41 The "private" conceptualization of wife beating has traditionally influenced po-
lice responses. Male violence within the home was originally excluded from police
action. Information about such crimes came from police reports (until recent advent
of crime surveys/victimization surveys). Elizabeth A. Stanko, Fear of Crime and the
Myth of the Safe Home, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 14, at 75, 79. Re-
form efforts have changed police responses, but not necessarily police perceptions,
and have led to the preference for mandatory arrest in abuse situations. See Cheryl
Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence
Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1996); Schulhofer, supra note 30, at 2162-70.
But see LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN ET AL., POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: EXPERI-
MENTS AND DILEMMAS (1992) (expressing a preference for police discretion because
of varying results in effectiveness in studies and because of the possibility of escala-
tion effects).
42 [P]rosecutors in a number of communities have taken the emergence of
woman abuse seriously as a major crime problem and have developed pro-
cedures that allow them to prosecute batterers successfully. In other
places, however, prosecutors still argue that most abuse cases are minor,
undeserving of their attention, and/or that the women always drop the
charges because they do not want their husbands to go to jail, so there is no
point in prosecuting these cases.
Naomi R. Cahn & Lisa G. Lerman, Prosecuting Woman Abuse, in WOMAN BAT-
TERING: POLICY RESPONSES 95, 96, 104-06 (Michael Steinman ed., 1991) (citation
omitted) [hereinafter WOMAN BATrERING].
Prosecutors believed that judges would dismiss all but the most egregious
violations with a simple admonishment .... Judges were frustrated by
what they considered to be a lack of acceptable sentencing options; not
wanting to separate wage earners from their families, or believing that vio-
lence in a domestic setting was not truly "criminal" behavior ....
Donald G. Dutton & Barbara M.S. McGregor, The Symbiosis of Arrest and Treat-
ment for Wife Assault: The Case for Combined Intervention, in WOMAN BATTERING,
supra, at 131.
43 See Fagan, supra note 14, at 394.
44 See infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
45 Contributing to the "silence" is the categorization of battering under other
types of crime. See Dee Michael Steinman, The Public Policy process and Woman
Battering: Problems and Potentials, in WOMAN BATTERING, supra note 42, at 1, 5;
Hart, supra note 34, at 627:
Many battered women who earnestly seek prosecution find substantial
resistance to the appropriate charging of defendants. National data reveal
that law enforcement routinely classifies domestic assault as misdemeanors
even though the criminal conduct involved actually included bodily injury
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the issues and is therefore a means of creating silence. Police
reticence in arrest and prosecution choices limit the cases and
issues available for judges to select in writing their opinions.
While not all cases can, nor should, be prosecuted, this filtering
system, through the police, the prosecutor, and then the judge's
choice in which opinions to write, may in fact give a false sense of
the seriousness of the cases coming forward, while marginalizing
the import of those that do not.46
Legal participants and observers have a natural tendency to
focus on the most egregious cases, the ones that absolutely have
to be addressed. 47 Unfortunately, it is the smaller, seemingly less
significant cases that are most important to the eradication of this
kind of violence.4 8 Murder in the home by an intimate is rarely
random. It starts with a small indiscretion, abusive word or
phrase, or minor physical contact, but then escalates. Analo-
gously, in the law we tend to focus most heavily on the Supreme
Court and other upper-level decisions, but it is the trial court or
administrative decisions that have the most direct effect and
greatest impact on individual lives.4 9 Though the sound emanat-
ing from a single Supreme Court opinion may be quite loud, the
accumulation of the tiny silences from each lower-level court is a
cacophony.
A. The Dictates of the Patriarchal Order
The systemic nature of the silence5 ° surrounding domestic
as serious or more serious than 90% of all rapes, robberies, and aggravated
assaults.
46 See infra Part IV. In their 1979 ground-breaking work, DOBASH & DOBASH,
supra note 32, at 207-22, describe the inattention of the police and judiciary. Im-
provements have been made in police responses, including mandatory arrest,
prosecutorial training in handling these cases, and attempts to educate judges about
the seriousness of domestic violence. While there is cause to celebrate the advance
in this area, there is greater cause to push forward and insist on greater reform.
47 See Separation, supra note 29, at 3 ("The self-defense cases in which women kill
their batterers are small in number compared to the overall universe of domestic
violence .... ").
48 See infra notes 264-68 and accompanying text.
49 Heilbrun & Resnik, supra note 2, at 1937-44; see also infra note 210.
50 Silence, as referred to in this Article, includes more than merely the literal. The
breadth of silence entails the entire range of obfuscation and elimination. It in-
cludes both its existence, in its negative form, and the acts creating, contributing to,
and perpetuating silence. There are even difficulties in attempts to discuss the si-
lence. Such a discussion is necessarily a theoretical proposition. There is rarely di-
rect confirmation, as we had in the Person case, of silence, but comes in the form of
circumstance and shadow. Silence is not documented and its existence and effects
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abuse presents a daunting challenge. The judicial system is inte-
gral to the operation of society and, in fact, tailors society's direc-
tion and has immeasurable impact on social customs. 51 Though
judges appear to be last in the chain, they nonetheless may be the
most important. In a cyclical way, judges influence the first steps
in the process by sending signals as to appropriate responses by
all other actors, including the batterer, police and prosecutors,
and by defining the levels of violence and control of one person
by another permissible in society. The courts thereby help define
what is not culturally permissible within the enforcement com-
munity and the greater society. The judiciary must be responsi-
ble to the public in the messages it transmits.
Silence by the courts contributes to the conceptualization of
separate public and private spheres,52 perpetuating the violence
in both substance and form. Substance is apparent as silence is
permissive, implicitly condoning the existing violence and en-
couraging its perpetuation. Form is more complex in that it is
the relevant governing structure determining what is silenced.
These structures are both self-replicating and cyclical. The na-
ture of the patriarchal family structure is to imitate the governing
structure of the state.53 However, because the state is comprised
are rarely, if ever, studied. Though not the direct purpose of this Article, it might
serve as a challenge to social scientists to make such studies. See Hotaling et al.,
supra note 40, at 352, 364-65 (pointing out that part of the problem is the lack of
research exploring this connection); see also Lee Ann Hoff, Collaborative Feminist
Research and the Myth of Objectivity, in FEMINIST PERSPECInVES, supra note 14, at
269 (demonstrating inherent biases in research methodologies). On a related point,
Peter Margulies points out that the social science used in criminal trials is troubling,
precisely because it is silent on the subordinated groups who may be directly af-
fected by such evidence. Peter Margulies, Identity on Trial: Subordination, Social
Science Evidence, and Criminal Defense, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 45, 52 (1998). In-
deed, this discussion is primarily about the silence, and not the events that are si-
lenced. It too operates to silence.
51 See, e.g., George Kateb, Brown and the Harm of Legal Segregation, in RACE,
LAW AND CULTURE (Austin Sarat ed., 1997) (using Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), repudiated by Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954), to critique Chief Justice Warren's central argument about the harms
caused by the intentional humiliation of legal segregation); Peggy Cooper Davis,
Contested Images of Family Values: The Role of the State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1348,
1349 (1994) (arguing that women's and children's rights are grounded in the moral
independence view that forbids state action for no other purpose than moral stan-
dard setting).
52 See Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983) (coining the terminology of "separate
spheres" in describing conceptualizations of male and female roles).
53 This view of patriarchy corresponds with the classical form of thought pro-
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of the individuals in those families, it is also true that the state
replicates those structures of power and authority.54
Coverture is no longer official doctrine; we abrogated the im-
munities accorded to spouses, amended statutes concerning in-
heritance, property ownership, and right to contract. Women are
now able to hold an action for physical and sexual assault in their
own name. These changes have brought great strides in achiev-
ing the goal of equality. Nevertheless, silence and inattention to
family violence5 5 continue to perpetuate the patriarchal structure
and the framework of violence that maintains it. 56 Silence reaf-
firms the patriarchal order by privileging some kinds of control,
force, and violence by selective attention and enforcement and,
thereby, permits a de facto form of spousal immunity.
The patriarchal order dictates the nature of the silence sur-
rounding domestic abuse. Within this framework, there may be a
variety of reasons for its perpetuation.57  Most apparently, si-
lence inheres for fear of change.58 Those without courage gener-
ally prefer the status quo. Silence permits avoidance of the
underlying problems and issues of concern.59 Perhaps the silence
is to avoid augmenting the shame of the victim or shame from
pounded by Sir Robert Filmer, where the family structure is identical to that of the
state. See PATEMAN, supra note 5, at 24-25.
54 This view of patriarchy corresponds with the traditional form of thought, where
the family serves as metaphor for other power relations. See id. at 23-24.
55 See Siegel, supra note 10. Silence is both historical and systematic. See
Schulhofer, supra note 30, at 2151 (discussing the relationship of the historical legal
treatment of wife-beating and the current levels of toleration for abuse in the legal
system). There is a history of the legal system's permissive attitude toward wife-
beating and current levels of toleration for abuse. There is silence at every step in
the chain of justice.
56 See infra Part II.
57 There is a relationship between personal experiences of disempowerment and
oppression and broader political action and consequences. Monique Deveaux, Fem-
inism and Empowerment: A Critical Reading of Foucault, in FEMINIST INTERPRETA-
TIONS OF MICHEL FOUCAULT 211, 232 (Susan J. Hekman ed., 1996) [hereinafter
INTERPRETATIONS OF FOUCAULT] (referring to instances of activism against social
oppressions). It follows that there are also consequences of inaction.
58 Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term, Foreword: Nomos and Narra-
tive, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 68 (1983).
59 Avoidance is a form of silencing. "[O]mission, rejection, and ambivalence-
share a common dynamic: each is a way of underexposing the intentional object in
order to minimize its significance in the final picture." ELAINE SCARRY, RESISTNG
REPRESENTATION 95 (1994) (emphasis omitted); see also Cover, supra note 58, at 66
(discussing Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), and its avoid-
ance of the question whether Congress could constitutionally grant tax exemption to
a school that discriminates on the basis of race).
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the judge's inability (or refusal) to empower the victim. Another
possibility is that the relative power position of the batterer is a
replication of the power position of the judiciary60 (imposing a
specific order through violence, conceptual or actual).61 Or, if
the traditional conceptualization of family and home is a replica-
tion of the state governing structure, challenging the authority of
the batterer might also challenge the authority of the state.62
Families tend to be silent about their own dysfunction. In a per-
verse twist, the state may be replicating the family in its dysfunc-
tion.63 Rather than dealing with these issues publicly, we hide
from them, almost denying their existence. Maybe the courts pre-
fer silence to avoid the sex and sexual implications inherent in
the marital relationship, the writing about which, along with the
violence and power imbalance, would have almost a porno-
graphic or voyeuristic appeal.64 Another reason for the silence
might be to hold fast to a particular community image,65 or image
of self. Breaking the silence implicates the self in the violence.66
60 See PATEMAN, supra note 5 (discussing the traditional and modern forms of
patriarchy).
61 See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986).
62 See PATEMAN, supra note 5 (discussing the classical form of patriarchy).
63 Part of the dysfunction is denial and efforts to cover up or ignore the dysfunc-
tion. See Layne A. Prest & Howard Protinsky, Family Systems Theory: A Unifying
Framework for Codependence, 21 AM. J. FAM. THERAPY 352 (1993) (noting the dys-
functional family and co-dependency within it are kept silent as indicated by the
pervasiveness of the problem and the very insignificant recognition of the issue). In
this area, it seems the state is also a means of covering social ills. Cf. Robert Weis-
berg, Private Violence as Moral Action: The Law as Inspiration and Example, in
LAW'S VIOLENCE, supra note 9, at 175.
64 As pornography is the ultimate expression of dominance by the use of violence,
specifically in a sexual context, mere contemplation of the marital bed is enough to
come within its purview. Feminists have referred to marriage as just another form of
prostitution. See generally ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING
WOMEN 19, 102 (1981):
Wife beating and marital rape, pervasive here as elsewhere, are predicated
on the conviction that a man's ownership of his wife licenses whatever he
wishes to do to her: her body belongs to him to use for his own sexual
release, to beat, to impregnate. The male power of owning, by virtue of its
historical centrality, is barely constrained by the modest legal restrictions
put on it.
65 "In interpreting a text of resistance, any community must come to grips with
violence. It must think through the implications of living as a victim or perpetrator
of violence in the contexts in which violence is likely to arise." Cover, supra note 58,
at 50. Cover is referring to revolution in the collective community sense. Resistance
in the individual context no less implicates the community. Nor does it exclude the
judge as the interpretive authority.
66 See James Ptacek, Why do Men Batter their Wives, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 14, at 133, 139 (discussing the tendency to refuse one's own potential for
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Through self-identification, violence in the home is "too close to
home." Acknowledging the systems of control within our fami-
lies forces a personal involvement in the violence perpetuated by
the patriarchal order, ubiquitous in our society.
To the extent patriarchy informs the normative community and
self-image, it operates not only to silence actions not conceptual-
ized within the norm,6 7 but also marginalizes sub-cultures or
counter-cultures within the greater society, deepening the silence
within these communities. 68  The greater community image
serves to silence by marginalizing; images of the sub-culture op-
erate to silence further. As with the greater community, self-im-
age within ethnic minority and gay and lesbian communities is
the unifying force in the motive for silencing anyone outside of
that image.69
B. Silencing Communities Within the Community
Community for "others" tends to be two-fold: immediate and
greater, the immediate responding to the norms of the greater,
with the individual responding to both.7° The result is a doubled
dynamic of a power structure within a power structure. For ex-
ample, African American women and Latinas may prefer not to
use state resources in eliminating violence within their homes for
violence and how that can affect one's moral and political judgments); SONKIN ET
AL., supra note 4, at 180-87 (discussing the violence within and the images of it
around us).
67 See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 29, at 545-48 (discussing elder abuse).
68 See id. at 542-45 (discussing violence between lesbians); id. at 531-35 (discuss-
ing race essentialism); see also Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Sex, Culture,
and Rights: A Re/Conceptualization of Violence for the Twenty-First Century, 60
ALB. L. REV. 607, 625 (1997) ("Latinas as a group are so marginalized and invisible,
that statistics are rarely available to allow commentators to bring them to
visibility.").
69 See, e.g., Nancy Hammond, Lesbian Victims and the Reluctance to Identify
Abuse, in NAMING THE VIOLENCE 190 (Kerry Label ed., 1986); Barbara Hart, Pref-
ace, in NAMING THE VIOLENCE, supra, at 9, 14.
70 See Paula Gunn Allen, Violence and the American Indian Woman, in THE
SPEAKING PROFITS US: VIOLENCE IN THE LIVES OF WOMEN OF COLOR 5 (Maryvi-
olet C. Burns, M.Div. ed., 1986) [hereinafter THE SPEAKING PROFITS Us] (pointing
out that dealing with domestic abuse against a backdrop of a history of genocide is
daunting and silencing); Christine E. Rasche, Minority Women and Domestic Vio-
lence: The Unique Dilemmas of Battered Women of Color, 4 J. CONTEMP. CRIM.
JUST. 150, 152 (1986) (describing how minority women found themselves sharing
common concerns as well as peculiar ethnic problems with those of non-minority
women: "[F]or white women and women of color, the experience of battering is
quite similar but at the point of seeking help or escape from the abuse, women of
color face many problems that white battered women generally do not.").
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fear of further stigmatization of their communities, supporting
prevailing stereotypes, or precipitating greater violence. 71 Simi-
larly, concepts of community are so important among Asian
American communities, an import that may eclipse both self and
family, that Asian American women may maintain silence to
avoid bringing shame to their communities.72 In addition, some
women may have the additional burden of language barriers that
may literally operate to silence them.73
To the extent that gay and lesbian relationships are viewed as
deviant (that is, outside the expected patriarchal heterosexual re-
lationship), 4 there is already a forced silence (in the closet). The
silence is compounded when there is more silence concerning the
violence encountered in those "deviant" relationships .7  Gay
and lesbian relationships do not fit neatly within our expectation
of traditional relationships or our "cohesive national image."
71 See, e.g., Rasche, supra note 70, at 157 (indicating that under-reporting in
Asian American Communities may be more severe than the general population be-
cause of a perceived hostile white society); see Beth Richie, Battered Black Women:
A Challenge For the Black Community, BLACK SCHOLAR, Mar./Apr. 1985, at 43
("How can blacks in the domestic violence movement reconcile the reality of police
brutality and blatant racism in the criminal justice system with the need for police
and court intervention on behalf of battered women?"); Rasche, supra note 70, at
159-60 (discussing mistreatment of communities of color by the justice system); see
also Evelyn C. White, Life is a Song Worth Singing: Ending Violence in the Black
Family, in THE SPEAKING PROFITS Us, supra note 70, at 11. In addition, the history
of the abandonment of marital chastisement supports this viewpoint. Examination
of the doctrine transforming cases demonstrate class bias in enforcement and, where
race was involved, a greater interest in controlling African American men than in
protecting African American women. Siegel, supra note 10, at 2134-39.
72 See, e.g., Nilda Rimonte, Domestic Violence Among Pacific Asians, in MAKING
WAVES: AN ANTHOLOGY OF WRITINGS BY AND ABOUT ASIAN AMERICAN WOMEN
327, 328 (Asian Women United of California ed., 1989) [hereinafter MAKING
WAVES] (discussing how the Asian family's traditionally patriarchal system favors
the family and community over the individual, demanding silence to protect commu-
nity image); see also Tracy A. Lai, Asian Women: Resisting The Violence, in THE
SPEAKING PROFITS Us, supra note 70, at 8.
73 See Angela Ginorio & Jane Reno, Violence in the Lives of Latino Women, in
THE SPEAKING PROFITS Us, supra note 70, at 13 ("This absence of information
about Latina women reflects the triple burden of discrimination under which we
function . . . : ignored by men because we are women, ignored by white women
because we are women of color, and ignored by the English-speaking because ... we
can only speak in Spanish or Portuguese."). Rasche, supra note 70, at 157 (discuss-
ing how silence might be compounded by language barriers and both facetious and
real threats of deportation).
74 Thus, patriarchy is a complete system of control: silence on family matters; os-
tracism of those who do not fit within its expected norms.
75 See generally NAMING THE VIOLENCE, supra note 69 (attempting to break some
of the silence surrounding violence in lesbian relationships).
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Often in situations of intra-lesbian violence, lesbian sexuality is
punished instead of the violence, thereby accepting the violence
as expected in such situations.76 This is perversely consistent
with conceptualizations of heterosexual relationships. When
there is deviation from the expected patriarchal structure, vio-
lence is implicitly condoned and excused.
Thus, while enjoying privilege, it has come about that hetero-
sexual white men may also be silenced. Because the patriarchal
structure determines acceptable gender roles, 77 validating the use
of force by men to control women, occurrences of men battered
by women have historically been publicly ridiculed and labeled
"weak. '' 78 Men often remain silent about the abuse while staying
in the relationship to avoid ridicule for not conforming to their
expected gender roles.7 9
Because conformity with the "unified community image" is the
starting point in measuring degrees of silence, pointing out differ-
ence becomes unifying. Context, through each individual story
not only broadens the "cohesive national image" that informs the
normative, but also provides a better shot at justice for that
individual.
C. It is Still Violence in Private
The rationalization of domestic crime as "private" and as such
only due minimal, if any, state intervention, tends to be the pri-
mary justification for the silence surrounding it.8" Relegation of
these wrongs to the private is tantamount to forced silence; it is
in the public arena where public debate and speech have mean-
ingful impact. Ironically this is precisely the reason this crime is
76 See Ruthann Robson, Lavender Bruises: Intra-Lesbian Violence, Law and Les-
bian Legal Theory, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 567 (1990) (discussing how in
situations of intra-lesbian violence, lesbian sexuality is punished instead of the vio-
lence, thereby accepting the violence as expected in such situations).
77 Gender roles are also determined by race. See Fenton, supra note 10; Roberts,
supra note 10.
78 See Suzanne K. Steinmetz, The Battered Husband Syndrome, 2 VICTIMOLOGY
499 (1978) (detailing a history of social ridicule for both husbands and wives who did
not meet patriarchal gender role expectations).
79 Husbands also stay. See id. at 506-07 (discussing social roles and pressures,
resources, children, and other reasons men stay in battering relationships).
80 See Dutton & McGregor, supra note 42, at 132 (discussing reasons judges infre-
quently punish offenders with fines or jail time); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Vio-
lence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973 (1991) (discussing how the conceptualization
of woman battering as a private matter has contributed to the perpetuation of this
form of societal violence).
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the most serious and deserving of the most vociferous public con-
demnations. "In no other category of violent crime does one find
the offender going home to live with the victim."81 The interac-
tion of patriarchy with the concepts of the "private" dictate the
manner in which issues of domestic abuse are addressed. Unfor-
tunately, judicial silence on these issues not only contributes to
the "private" conceptualization, but also denies a primary ave-
nue for public awareness, one with the weight of authority to
change the status quo.
When the criminal courts are most willing to deal with domes-
tic violence, the focus tends to be on the worst results rather than
the incremental steps prior to and the ways to prevent them. The
greatest number of cases reported on domestic abuse concern
murder and its defenses. In fact, another facet of the silence is
our preoccupation with the most egregious results of abusive sit-
uations, rather than with the reasons for the environment that
permits abuse to exist at all.82 Murder is itself a silencing force:
"Many of the women killed by their husbands are killed after
they have separated. Ironically, since those women are not alive
to tell their stories, their voices disappear into the narrative
voices of the courts, where the women are not usually identified
as battered."83 That so many written discussions of domestic vio-
81 Cahn & Lerman, supra note 42, at 97; see also DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note
32, at 7 ("There can be no doubt that being assaulted or raped by a stranger in some
dark alleyway is frightening, humiliating, painful, and perhaps fatal, but are such
things any less horrific if they happen within the home at the hands of a relative?").
Roommates may also have to live with their victimizers. Broadly defined, this might
be considered a form of domestic abuse. Of course, prison inmates must also con-
tinue to live with their victimizers in many instances. The comparison between do-
mestic abuse and inmate abuse obviates the qualitative differences, and perhaps, the
similarities as well. See Angela Y. Davis, Public Imprisonment and Private Violence:
Reflections on the Hidden Punishment of Women, 24 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 339 (1998) (discussing the centrality of physical abuse in the lives of
women subject to state punishment and linking the punishment of women in the
private space to that in the public).
82 See infra notes 261-64 and accompanying text; see also STRAUS ET AL., supra
note 40, at 15 (suggesting that "this is because it is a crime which leaves physical
evidence which cannot be ignored in the same way that we can overlook other forms
of intrafamily violence," and generally criticizing it for not examining power differ-
entials in the kinds and degree of violence and abuse within the family) (emphasis
added)).
83 Separation, supra note 29, at 72 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also
Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation De-
fense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1344 (1997) (pointing out that "[s]tudies suggest that
between forty-five and fifty-six percent of all intimate homicides men commit in-
volve some element of separation" (citations omitted)).
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lence are stories of murder demonstrates the escalation necessary
for attention to the matter.' The frequency of murder in the
domestic setting, even with these discussions, is not perceived as
a cost of silence and a logical result of patriarchy. Thus, there is a
reaffirmation of the patriarchal order rather than an exposition
of the nature of the relationships that have potential to reach
such levels of violence.85 The evidence of patriarchy is manifest
when the treatment of victims is compared. Murder of a husband
has traditionally been treated as far more egregious than that of a
wife.8 6 Comparisons of the overall success of the use of Battered
84 See supra Part I. Evan Stark suggests that "between 40 and 93 percent of the
women in prison for murder or manslaughter killed partners who physically as-
saulted them, most in direct retaliation or to protect themselves and/or a child."
Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to
Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973 (1995) [hereinafter Re-presenting Woman
Battering] (citing ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 10 (1987)); see
also PETER D. CHIMBOS, MARITAL VIOLENCE: A STUDY OF INTERSPOUSE HOMI-
CIDE (1978); Manfred S. Guttmacher, Criminal Responsibility in Certain Homicide
Cases Involving Family Members, in PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 73 (Paul H. Hoch
& Joseph Zubin eds., 1955); Evan Stark, Rethinking Homicide: Violence, Race and
the Politics of Gender, 20 INT'L J. HEALTH SERVICES 3, 16-20 (1990) [hereinafter
Rethinking Homicide]; Franklin E. Zimring et al., Intimate Violence: A Study of In-
tersexual Homicide in Chicago, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 910, 910-21 (1983).
85 See Fagan, supra note 14, at 394.
86 The history of Anglo-American law treated assault on women as acceptable
practice and necessary to maintain authority. Conversely, husband killing was
viewed as treasonous, analogous to crimes against the state. As Blackstone
explained:
Husband and wife, in the language of law, are styled baron and feme. The
word baron, or lord, attributes to the husband not a very courteous superi-
ority. But we might be inclined to think this merely and unmenacing tech-
nical phrase, if we did not recollect that if the baron kills his feme it is the
same as if he had killed a stranger, or any other person; but if the feme kills
her baron, it is regarded by the laws as a much more atrocious crime, as she
not only breaks through the restraints of humanity and conjugal affection,
but throws off all subjection to the authority of her husband. And there-
fore the law denominates her crime a species of treason, and condemns her
to the same punishment as if she had killed the king.
Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of
Self-Defense, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623, 628-29 (1980) (quoting 1 W. BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (R. Welsh & Co. ed. 1897));
accord 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERICK MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENG-
LISH LAW 500 (2d ed. 1898); see also ANN JONES, NEXT TIME SHE'LL BE DEAD:
BATTERING & HOW TO STOP IT 5 (1994) (discussing how we tend to look to the
woman, the object of abuse, for the explanation for its occurrence: "We are still
inclined ... to regard whatever 'right' the abused woman has ... as merely formal,
contingent, conditional, and in competition with many rights traditionally enjoyed
by the man as paterfamilias and upheld by social institutions, religious leaders, pub-
lic officials, and politicians under the rubric of family values."); Steinman, supra
note 45, at 5 ("These hurdles are largely products of historical norms favoring patri-
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Woman Syndrome and the use of extreme emotional distress as a
defense is also instructive on this point.87
D. Existing Doctrine and the Inconsistencies
Explanations of Battered Woman Syndrome,88 both in and
out of court, have enabled juries and the general public to under-
stand the necessity perceived by the victim of abuse to find a
means of survival and to change the paradigm of self-defense as a
response to the "criminal justice system's covert toleration of
wife abuse."89 Nonetheless, this situation being perceived as a
"common story" has a long way to go. 90 Women who should be
able to use such evidence in fashioning a proper state of mind
defense are still limited by the traditional understanding of self-
defense and by a very limited conceptualization of battered wo-
men and their responses. 91 Battered Woman Syndrome, as the
state of mind element necessary to show reasonableness in self
defense of murder, has been denied full acceptance in courts for
many years.92 Even now with its gained acceptance, it is limited
by stereotypic expectations of battered women and of who may
properly assert the defense. 93 Battered Woman Syndrome has
archal power.., and limited government .... The former gives men power over
women .... The latter helps protect this relationship by defining government's role
narrowly and putting victims beyond government's protective reach." (citing
DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 32)); Maria L. Marcus, Conjugal Violence: The Law
of Force and the Force of Law, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1657, 1658-59 (1981).
87 Extreme emotional distress claims are the modern manifestation of the "heat of
passion" excuse. See generally Nourse, supra note 83.
88 For a historical account of the acceptance of Battered Woman Syndrome in the
courts, see Jones, supra note 86; Re-Presenting Woman Battering, supra note 84.
89 Michael A. Buda & Teresa L. Butler, The Battered Wife Syndrome: A Back-
door Assault on Domestic Violence, 23 J. FAM. L. 359 (1984-1985) (citation omitted).
90 See Schneider, supra note 14 (examining how sexual stereotypes of women and
the male orientation are built into the law and legal system and how the assertions of
self-defense by battered women are not requests for special treatment, but pleas for
equal treatment).
91 See Maguigan, supra note 27 (arguing that traditional self-defense doctrine is
applicable to self-defense claims of battered women who kill); see also Re-Presenting
Woman Battering, supra note 84, at 992-96 (discussing the constraints of gender ste-
reotypes and structural inequality placed on battered women who come before the
court as perpetrators of violence). But see George P. Fletcher, Domination in the
Theory of Justification and Excuse, 57 U. PiTT. L. REV. 553 (arguing that self-de-
fense should not be "bent" to include the claims arising from Battered Woman
Syndrome).
92 See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Resistance to Equality, 57 U. PIr. L. REV. 477
(1996) (discussing gender bias in the criminal process, especially in perceptions of
self-defense, the choice in defense, and expert testimony on battering).
93 In addition, representation must avoid stereotypes of the victim of "insanity,"
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had a mixed history: its canons developed primarily through the
work of, and stories told by, feminist activists have been limited
by the implicit reliance on a specific "deviance" model of women
to which the defendant must conform.94
The accession of Battered Woman Syndrome has been an ef-
fort, and even minor achievement, in the direction of establishing
appropriate canons and effectuating reform. Unfortunately,
there has also been the resistance to allowing the old canons to
accommodate Battered Woman Syndrome as dictated by the
overarching patriarchal paradigms. This point is further demon-
strated by an examination of the evolution of the provocation
defense in comparison.
This may be the starkest example of how the law embodies the
male perspective:95 under self-defense, the reasonableness of a
woman's actions characterized by Battered Woman Syndrome
are, at best, deemed questionable in light of the normative expec-
tations of immediacy; 96 under provocation, reasonableness is de-
termined by male understandings of self-actualization and male
perceptions of normal relationships based on the "pursue and
conquer" model. 97 The difference between the development of
the two doctrines is apparent considering that the law's basis for
objectivity is the male perspective98 and that within that perspec-
the "respectable woman" or the "violent brute" that have been used in the past and
have been particularly problematic for the use of Battered Woman Syndrome.
JONES, supra note 86, at 158-66 (describing the perversion of the defense as one of
insanity); Re-Presenting Woman Battering, supra note 84, at 992-96; see also Linda
L. Ammons, Mules, Madonnas, Babies, Bath Water, Racial Imagery and Stereotypes:
The African-American Woman and the Battered Woman Syndrome, 1995 Wis. L.
REV. 1003; Fenton, supra note 10; Jenny Rivera, Domestic Violence Against Latinas
by Latino Males: An Analysis of Race, National Origin, and Gender Differentials, 14
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 231 (1994).
94 See Schneider, supra note 92, at 499 (discussing how the issue of self-defense
may never reach the jury if the abused woman is not considered a "real" battered
woman); see also Erich D. Andersen & Anne Read-Andersen, Constitutional
Dimensions of the Battered Woman Syndrome, 53 OHIo ST. L.J. 363, 376 (1992);
Maguigan, supra note 27, at 381.
95 See Finley, supra note 23 (discussing how the language of law is gendered
male).
96 See Fletcher, supra note 91.
97 Separation assault is a manifestation of the classic pursue and conquer model of
relationships where the male dates or courts the female so that he can have sex or
get married (to have sex). See Nourse, supra note 83, at 1359. See generally Mary
E. Becker, The Abuse Excuse and Patriarchal Narratives, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 1459,
1478 (1998) ("[N]atural, moral, sexuality is between a male sexual subject who pur-
sues and a female sexual object who is pursued."); Separation, supra note 29.
98 Cf DWORKIN, supra note 64, at 108:
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tive the concept of "family violence" is nearly non-existent. 99
The irony is that batterers have historically enjoyed privileged
avoidance of the consequences for their actions merely by their
status within the family; objections and resistence to including
battered women within traditional doctrine or creating new doc-
trine are also based on status. 100
Based on the extensive empirical research and findings of Vic-
toria Nourse, 10 1 provocation defense cases have been told to the
point that its canons have expanded to better protect batterers
who kill.' 2 Extreme emotional distress in defense of batterers
has been used almost as "punishment" to the victim. 103 Reform-
ist concepts of the "heat of passion" defense have been used to
excuse the accused's outrage for even the mere desire of the vic-
tim to leave.' 0 4 In what Nourse describes as an unusual murder
Note too that the male commits an objective act. Men are able to be objec-
tive, an exalted capacity, precisely because they are not objects. To be ob-
jective means that one knows the world, sees it as it is, acts on the objects
in it appropriately .... Women, the logs at issue, cannot be objective or act
objectively because objects do not see or know.
See also Nancy Hartsock, Postrmodernism and Political Change: Issues for Feminist
Theory, in INTERPRETATIONS OF FOUCAULT, supra note 57, at 39 (noting that domi-
nation, viewed from above, is more likely to appear as equality).
99 See de Lauretis, supra note 38, at 246:
To say that (a) the concept of "family violence" did not exist before the
expression came into being,... is not the same as saying that (b) "family
violence" did not exist before "family violence" became part of the dis-
course of social science. The enormously complex relation binding expres-
sion, content, and referent (or sign, meaning, and object) is what makes (a)
and (b) not the same.
100 See Marcus, supra note 86, at 1658 (pointing out that marriage created a status
that for many years excused the actions of men and that comparatively Battered
Woman Syndrome is resisted in its creation of status that excuses the actions of
women).
101 See Nourse, supra note 83, at 1332 ("Our most modern and enlightened legal
ideal of 'passion' reflects, and thus perpetuates, ideas about men, women, and their
relationships that society long ago abandoned.").
102 See id. Nourse explains that the reformation of the "heat of passion" excuse
for the more modern "emotional distress" have expanded a batterer's ability to re-
ceive a reduced conviction of manslaughter over the often more appropriate convic-
tion for murder. Id.
103 Id. at 1364 ("What seems less clear is how the law can avoid the implications
of its choice-that it partially condones the use of private violence to punish danc-
ing, traveling, and turning.").
104 Id. at 1332. Of states following the MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 (1985), in
whole or part, one-quarter of the cases reported between 1980 and 1995, involved a
departure or separation prompting a passionate homicide. An amazing consequence
knowing that one of the most dangerous times for a battered woman is during the
period she chooses to leave. "Reform of the passion defense, however, has yielded
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case, State v. Traficonda 105 where the defendant shot his victim
with a Winchester rifle in their home, the court noted that most
of the evidence supporting the defense "'pointed to the defend-
ant's mental and physical abuse of the victim,"' demonstrated a
willingness for the defense based on the defendant's own violent
acts. 10 6 Traficonda was only unusual in that it was explicit. The
pattern of these stories soon becomes familiar. The court nar-
rates a story of infidelity. Only by reading the cases carefully is it
apparent that these are claims of departure. 0 7 The victim was
divorced from the man now claiming her loyalty. She had left
because she believed he was abusing their daughter, or she
sought shelter in a home for battered women. It turns out in the
pattern of cases that her separation from him is accepted as the
basis for his state of mind, permitting him the justification. Con-
sidering that the batterer's self-justification for his actions de-
pends on the rationale that "she deserved it" or she did
something to precipitate or "provoke" him,0 8 the provocation
defense goes on to reaffirm removing the male from responsibil-
ity for his actions while continuing to blame the victim for the
situation. 9
It is understood that the most dangerous time for a victim of
abuse is when she decides to leave.110 Thus, the law is structured
in a way that almost completely traps the victim of domestic
abuse. On one hand, part of the stereotype and expectation of
an abuse victim is that if the abuse is too bad, she will leave."'
However, in cases where she does not leave, her status as a vic-
tim is brought into question, which may affect the effective use of
Battered Woman Syndrome in her defense. On the other hand,
in cases where she does find the wherewithal to leave, she is
often putting herself in more danger and may be strengthening
precisely the opposite result, binding women to the emotional claims of husbands
and boyfriends long ago divorced or rejected." Nourse, supra note 83, at 1334.
105 612 A.2d 45 (Conn. 1992).
106 Nourse, supra note 83, at 1354 (quoting Traficonda, 612 A.2d at 49). Nourse
also points out, it is not only women killed, but also the man helping her to leave,
the sheriff, the mover, or new lover, who dies, while the killer successfully claims the
provocation defense. Id. at 1335.
107 Id. at 1361 (citations omitted).
108 See MILDRED DALEY PAGELOW, WOMAN-BATTERING: VICTMS AND THEIR
EXPERIENCES 54 (1981).
109 Cf supra note 98.




the abuser's defenses1 12 and ability to get away with murder.
The law's resistance to change, or even accommodation of multi-
ple perspectives to find justice in every situation, becomes a
means of complicity in domestic abuse.
E. Does Private Violence Fit Within the Current System?
Where the violence has not yet escalated to the point of no
return, incidents of interpersonal violence are most often dealt
with informally, in a quasi-criminal context, through the vast
numbers of protective orders granted (but not as often en-
forced) 113 in civil courts, or obscured by the treatment of vio-
lence as expected in relationships in family and divorce
proceedings. "More often the complaints of battered women are
shunted into municipal or family courts to be heard by civil
judges-which makes the offense complained of by definition a
civil matter and not a crime." '114
In fact, the judicial system has difficulty dealing with family
issues in the criminal context at all. 15 This is not just because it
is difficult to conceptualize violence in family relations, but also,
for a variety of good reasons, victims may prefer civil reme-
dies.' 16 Such reasons may include not wanting to criminally pun-
ish one whom they continue to love, or the one whom is the
father to their children, or the family, as a unit, cannot afford to
do without the income brought in by that individual. Thus, not
only does family violence not fit neatly within existing doctrine, it
also does not fit psychologically or sociologically.
17
Family divisions of civil courts may seem to be the logical place
to deal with crimes between family members. However, family is
the greatest ideological stronghold of patriarchy and, without
vigilance, furthers the batterer's ability to control and exacer-
bates the violence. In addition, serious problems arise when
dealing with family violence exclusively in the civil context. In
the least, the civil system is not designed to effectively deal with
112 Nourse, supra note 83, at 1365 ("[T]he logic of reform, which focuses almost
exclusively on the defendant's subjective state, operates to obscure competing fac-
tual narratives.").
113 See Peter Finn, Civil Protection Orders: A Flawed Opportunity for Interven-
tion, in WOMAN BAT-TERING, supra note 42, at 155.
114 JONES, supra note 86, at 28.
115 See id.; supra note 34.
116 Cf. supra note 114 and accompanying text.
117 Family violence research has traditionally been separated from criminological
research. See generally FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 14.
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violence. The basic premise underlying the civil system is that
the parties have an equal power balance in settling their dis-
putes.' 1 8 The mere fact of divorce litigation pits the parties
against each other in an adversarial model, intensifying the com-
bativeness of the relationship. In fact, the current movement to
return to "fault" in divorce proceedings, contributes to the si-
lence by preferring to deal with the violence in a civil context, in
a more private forum, rather than in the more public context of
the criminal courts. In addition, the civil system is no less subject
to patriarchal structures. Further, without the evidence neces-
sary to prove the fault ground, the parties would be forced to
stay together, with the violence, in private. In addition, scholars
have demonstrated the lengths to which courts will go to protect
paternal rights in child disputes, despite ample evidence of vio-
lence to the mother. 119
As Stephen Schulhofer points out, the criminal justice system
is preoccupied with male victims and male perpetrators primarily
because that reflects the nature of the underlying phenomenon
of crime in our society. 120 For those reasons, it would be impru-
dent to change the overall structure of the justice system. How-
ever, this should not preclude the criminal justice system from
developing new canons within its boundaries to deal with a spe-
cific doctrinal area. Similarly, criminal law prefers to deal in sin-
gle occurrences, rather than full context or series of events.' 2 '
This may be because our normative understanding of crime is a
single occurrence between individuals with limited contact or
continuity of relationship. 122 This makes it difficult for courts to
118 There are exceptions to this basic premise, including the treatment of adhesion
contracts and assumptions of corporate power. Power imbalances in these excep-
tions tend to be easily ascertainable. The power balance underlying human intimate
relations are not so easily ascertained and are far more complex, suggesting that the
courts cannot, or should not, try to handle the power imbalances of domestic abuse
as an exception.
119 JONES, supra note 86, at 33-35; Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Wo-
men: The Impact of Domestic Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L.
REv. 1041 (1991).
120 Schulhofer, supra note 30, at 2157; see also supra note 29.
121 See, e.g., Women's Lives, supra note 29, at 75:
When battering is seen only as discrete episodes of physical assault, this
facilitates the position that leaving the relationship is the sole appropriate
form of self-assertion. But battering reflects a quest for control that goes
beyond separate incidents of physical violence and that does not stop when
the woman attempts to leave.
122 See infra note 126.
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deal with situations that only have relevance in the full context of
a relationship over a continuous period of time. It only makes
sense that an entire area of cases that do not neatly fit within
doctrine established for different normative understandings
should be dealt within doctrine separately created.123
Finally, not only is the preference for civil solutions over crimi-
nal responsibility a means of silencing, but the preferred civil so-
lutions may, in fact, increase and condition further violence.
Once the violence has reached intolerable levels, the preferred
civil solution is divorce, a form of separation. The preference for
separation, however, creates two problems. First, there is an in-
centive for victims to avoid the use of the judicial system lest
their family relationships be destroyed.124 Second, separation
does not eradicate the violence. In fact, it is often the case that
when there is separation, there is an escalation of violence, at
times to the point of death.
1 25
Law is intended to stigmatize and exclude offenders through
prosecution, trial and imprisonment; instead, silence serves to
stigmatize and exclude the victims. 126 Violence and its potential
use are the unspoken means of maintaining silence. The core of
silence, regardless of the various layers of subordination,127 in
part, is understood through our conceptualizations of violence in
law and society.
123 See Schulhofer, supra note 30, at 2153 ("The problems [confronting women in
criminal justice] can be worked out only by paying close attention to particulars." ).
In other words, the stories demonstrating the issues and problems confronted by
women, in this case victims of domestic abuse, need to be told through the courts in
a manner that will allow the law to evolve to meet those needs. See also Schneider,
supra note 29.
124 The choice not to leave is most accurately understood as part of a comprehen-
sive strategy of self-protection. See Separation, supra note 29, at 61-63. Martha
Mahoney points out that the "shopworn question," "why didn't she leave?" reveals
several assumptions about separation: that the right solution is separation, that it is
the woman's responsibility to achieve separation, and that she could have separated.
Id. at 61-71.
125 Women's Lives, supra note 29, at 79 (discussing "separation assault" as the
primary answer to the question, "why doesn't she leave?"); see also Karla Fischer et
al., The Culture of Battering and the Role of Mediation in Domestic Violence Cases,
46 SMU L. REV. 2117, 2138-39 (1993).
126 "[F]eminist writings on empowerment suggest the need to place the subject's
interpretation and mediation of her experiences at the center of our inquiries into
the hows and whys of power." Deveaux, supra note 57, at 233 (discussing the writ-
ings of Audre Lorde, Patricia Hill Collins and bell hooks).






Violence has become the domain of the other. Such acts are
antithetical to the way in which we imagine ourselves behav-
ing. We like to believe that we cannot understand what makes
one person harm another. Yet one consequence of the puzzle
over the violence criminals do becomes an uncertainty about
ourselves and our neighbors. The violent act comes to define
a character as different from us, as criminal. This person ap-
pears to be outside of human community, perhaps less than
human. But this boundary, seemingly so secure, begins to
erode when we become aware of a neighbor's violence ....
We draw away from these offenders but remain uneasily
aware that the violence we thought we had excluded from the
community has found its way back into our midst. At such
moments we turn away or deny the characterization of the act
because otherwise our very identity seems in doubt.'
2 9
We' 30 tend to treat violence as anomalous rather than as a nat-
ural part of our society, an integral part of the operation of law,
and intrinsic to the operation of the family. The manner in which
we portray violence allows us to think of it as exceptional and
believe only the best of ourselves and our society. We tend to
absent the force present in family relationships used to maintain
the family structure when we conceptualize the typical family.
13'
We also disassociate violence from the natural order of society
and from the dynamic underlying the power of the law and corre-
sponding government functions. 132 Robert Cover exposed the
128 The term violence as used in the discussion here refers to both the literal and
the conceptual. See Cover, supra note 61; see also ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, Violence
and the Law, in THE RULE OF LAW 54, 60 (Robert Paul Wolff ed., 1971) (pointing
out that the common practice of restricting the term "violence" to uses of force,
'usually serves the ideological purpose of ruling out, as immoral or politically
illegitimate, the only instrument of power that is available to certain social classes.").
129 Randall McGowen, Punishing Violence, Sentencing Crime, in THE VIOLENCE
OF REPRESENTATION, supra note 38, at 140.
130 1 deliberately use the universalizing pronouns, "we," "us," and "our" as the
referent in the text. Though norms often exclude the perspectives of many in soci-
ety, we are all products of them, we all live with them, and we must all work toward
changing them. The use of these terms is also intended to make the reader experi-
ence a level of discomfort. We ought to be uncomfortable with that which needs to
be changed.
131 From a Filmerian perception of the family as a sub-unit of government, this
conceptualization is not surprising. See PATEMAN, supra note 5; see also Restuccia,
supra note 38, at 67 ("For it appears that it is in the nature of violence to reproduce
itself .... ").
132 See Cover, supra note 61.
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manner in which this operates in his insightful discussion of the
force of law.133 Given the violence inherent in the force of law,
we must consider the consequences of courts' unwillingness to
wield their power to describe, address, and participate in the
elimination of violence experienced in society, both public and
private, whether directly occasioned by the state or not.
The absenting of violence from society happens in at least two
ways, both dependent on our conceptualizations. First, where
the violence is public, we make the act into a spectacle and the
individual committing the act into a deviant. Second, where the
violence is private, we ignore, hide and silence the violence as
much as possible. 134 Thus, our treatment of public violence
removes us from responsibility for the violence without, while
our treatment of private violence shields us from the potential
violence within. Contributing to this dynamic is the conceptual-
ization of two separate spheres, public and private, dividing the
conceptual types of violence.135 Both operate as a means of si-
lencing the existence of violence within society. Both operate as
a means of creating personal and community image.
A. Public Violence
Our common understanding of public violence is that which is
unjustified and occurs to and by other people who do not appear
to be in an intimate relationship. 136 Not only is public violence
133 Id. (discussing interpretive practices in the law that ignore the violence it occa-
sions and/or justifies); see also LAw's VIOLENCE, supra note 9 (a collection of schol-
arly essays discussing the works of Robert Cover).
134 See DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 32, at 8 ("When forced to acknowledge
[family violence's] existence, we attempt to deny that it is widespread or severe or
that it happens between 'normal' people."); Stanko, supra note 41, at 83 ("As it
stands, the conceptualization of violent crime remains firmly linked to acts randomly
perpetuated by strangers against seemingly innocent, undeserving victims.").
135 The myth of the safe home is deeply entrenched in the minds of most
Americans. This myth is supported by academics and policy makers who
fail to recognize the potential danger of the home as a locus of violence
against women. Why, for instance, do images of serious crime, particularly
interpersonal violence, continuously focus on street crime-crime suppos-
edly committed by strangers-rather than on the interpersonal violence
that exists at such high levels in American households?
Stanko, supra note 41, at 76.
136 According to the U.S. Department of Justice, intimates, as defined by the vic-
tim, include spouses, ex-spouses, boyfriends, girlfriends, and former boyfriends and
girlfriends. See VIOLENCE BY INTIMATES, supra note 29, at vi ("[T]hose who com-
mitted a violent crime against an intimate represent about 25% of convicted violent
offenders in local jails and about 7% of violent offenders in State prisons.").
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perpetrated by and to "others ''137 it is only referred to as vio-
lence when it is perceived as illegitimate. This conceptualization
allows us to view violence in our society as deviant, exceptional
occurrences of which "normal" civilized individuals are
incapable.
We accomplish this conceptualization through a variety of
means. First, the media tends to emphasize certain acts and be-
haviors as violent and tends to give more attention to those acts
committed by particular kinds of people. 38 In this way, certain
categories become automatic mind associations for crime."'
137 "Others" refers to those marginalized in American society for reasons of iden-
tity, including race, gender, religion, sexual orientation, and disability. This list is
not intended to be exclusive, but to point out those categories that have traditionally
served to disprivilege. Acknowledging the possibility of simultaneous privilege and
disprivilege, it is important to note that one's status as "other" is dependent on con-
text. Cf. supra note 130.
138 Authors point out that:
[V]iolent crimes committed by blacks comprised a substantial portion of
coverage of news stories centrally featuring blacks. Just as important, in
video presentation black criminals were portrayed quite differently from
white criminals. The former were more likely to remain unnamed, to be
seen in handcuffs, in physical custody, and were less likely to speak for
themselves. These findings strongly suggest that the media contribution is
one of both linking blacks to the issue of crime and, moreover, rendering
stereotypes of blacks more negative.
Jon Hurwitz & Mark Peffley, Public Perceptions of Race and Crime: The Role of
Racial Stereotypes, 41 AM. J. POL. Sci. 375, 376 (1997) (citing Robert Entman,
Blacks in the News: Television, Modern Racism, and Cultural Change, 69 JOURNAL-
ISM Q. 341 (1992)). For example, the issue of Dukakis' "softness" on crime during
his presidential campaign could have been pointed out without using a menacing
looking picture of Willie Horton, an African American prisoner on furlough. Id. at
377 (citing KATHLEEN H. JAMIESON, DIRTY POLITICS: DECEPTION, DISTRACTION,
AND DEMOCRACY (1992)). For another example, when two men beat and left a gay
student for dead, his tormentor taunted, "It's gay awareness week." James Brooke,
Witnesses Trace Brutal Killing of Gay Student, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1998, at A9.
When Susan Smith described a carjacker/kidnapper as a black man between 20 and
30-years-old, the fabrication was believed and reported, until the real fate of her
children was discovered. Rick Bragg, Police Say Woman Admits to Killings as Bod-
ies of 2 Children Are Found Inside Her Car, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1994, at Al. Mar-
ian Meyers discusses the interconnection between sexist violence and racism,
referencing the Stuart case of a white suburbanite claim that a black man killed his
pregnant wife and the media's willingness to believe and perpetuate that myth. See
NEWS COVERAGE, supra note 37, at 51. Though studies on news coverage on bat-
tering remain substantially undone, she suggests that "the news downplays the ex-
tent of the crime through underreporting and distorts what is reported through the
omission of significant details." Id.
139 See Richard Cohen, Closing the Door on Crime, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 1986,
(Magazine), at W13 (suggesting that jewelers and taxi drivers are rational in exclud-
ing certain customers on the basis of race). But see Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa
Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negro-
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Public violence is also often excused, if only subtly, by the char-
acteristics of the victim. 140 Hate crimes, 141 both individually and
institutionally, are recorded prominently throughout history, in-
cluding holy wars, enslavement, lynch mobs, the Holocaust, Mc-
Carthyism, and apartheid.14  The perpetrator self-justifies
through the characteristics of the victim. The media, may openly
condemn the act, yet reconfirm the deviant nature of the "other,"
whether perpetrator or victim. 143 Thus, the conceptualization of
phobes 46 STAN. L. REV. 781 (1994). See also Randall A. Gordon et al., Majority
Group Perceptions of Criminal Behavior: The Accuracy of Race-Related Crime Ste-
reotypes, 26 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCH. 148 (1996) (noting that a survey of respondents
underestimate the number of theft, motor vehicle and aggravated assault offenses
for whites, but overestimate these numbers for blacks); Hurwitz & Peffley, supra
note 138 (analyzing their 1994 survey of race and crime, the authors highlight that
racial stereotypes are significant in whites' perceptions of guilt).
140 An example might be the differing response by the United States to the geno-
cide in Rwanda versus that in Kosovo. The difference seems to indicate we place a
different import on one kind of violence over the other. See Ann M. Simmons,
Nato's Role Reaffirms Doubts Among Africans, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1999, at A16
(suggesting that the United States is deeply involved in conflicts in Kosovo because
the victims are white while U.S. policy toward African nations is to allow genocide
to continue); Zainab Jah, Editorial, Serbia Forfeited Sovereignty Right, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar., 29, 1999, at A20.
141 See Abraham Abramovsky, Bias Crime: A Call for Alternative Responses, 19
FORDHAM URn. L.J. 875 (1992) (discussing the aftermath of the Crown Heights ri-
ots); Dwight Greene, Hate Crimes, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 905 (1994) (discussing ra-
cially motivated violence); Frederick M. Lawrence, The Punishment Of Hate:
Toward a Normative Theory of Bias-Motivated Crimes, 93 MICH. L. REV. 320 (1994)
(proposing a framework for assessing and dealing with hate crimes); Lester Olim-
stead-Rose, Hate Violence: Symptom of Prejudice, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 439
(1991) (discussing violence targeting gays and lesbians); Bruce Pitts, Eliminating
Hate: A Proposal For a Comprehensive Bias Crime Law, 14 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 139
(1990) (defining bias crimes and explaining the necessity of bias crime laws); Lu-in
Wang, The Transforming Power of "Hate": Social Cognition Theory and the Harms
of Bias-Related Crime, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 47 (1997) (arguing for enhanced punish-
ments for bias crime offenders).
142 See GLENN T. ESKEW, BUT FOR BIRMINGHAM: THE LOCAL AND NATIONAL
MOVEMENTS IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE (1997); MCCARTHYISM: THE GREAT
AMERICAN RED SCARE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (Albert Fried ed., 1997) (viola-
tion of civil rights to eliminate communism); PETER PARTNER, GODS OF BATTLE,
HOLY WARS OF CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM (1997) (discussing holy wars); SURVI-
VORS, VICTIMS AND PERPETRATORS: ESSAYS ON THE NAZI HOLOCAUST (Joel E.
Dimsdale ed., 1980) (racial extermination); IDA B. WELLS-BARNEYIF', SELECTED
WORKS OF IDA B. WELLS (1991) (discussing lynching as a mode of racial control).
143 Cf ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN 59 (1985) ("Power is cautious. It
covers itself. It bases itself in another's pain and prevents all recognition that there
is 'another' by looped circles that ensure its own solipsism."); Anthony Paul Farley,
The Black Body as Fetish Object, 76 OR. L. REV. 457, 461 (1997) (arguing that
"blackness has become a form of masochistic pleasure").
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public violence contributes to the creation of the "other." 144
We are resistant to discussing actions of the police as violent
because we view the police as institutionally legitimate. 145 This is
particularly the case when such acts are committed against those
belonging to groups who are stereotyped as violent. 146 State vio-
lence in the form of capital punishment, though controversial, is
generally considered a legitimate act and therefore not often
characterized as murder and hardly ever identified as violence.147
144 "[N]egative attributes of the self or of one's in-group come to be perceived as
characteristics of members of some out group." David L. Hamilton et al., Social
Cognition and the Study of Stereotyping, in SOCIAL COGNITION: IMPACT ON SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 291, 293 (Patricia G. Devine et al. eds., 1994) (explaining that from a
psychodynamic perspective, stereotypes serve the motivational needs of the per-
ceiver, through the use of defense mechanisms, such as projection and displace-
ment). Thus, we may project our own capacities for violence on to others.
Following the strictures of dichotomous thinking, would it be fair to say that race
is public and gender (and sex) is private? Given the suggested conceptualizations of
public and private violence, the means for the creation of the "other" and the pro-
tection of the "self," it seems this would be a fair statement. Absolutist dichotomous
concepts problematize context. First consider the conjunction in the treatment of
battering of minority women or of gays and lesbians. How does this explain our
understanding of pornography or prostitution?
145 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 24, at 172-92 (discussing police brutality, urban ri-
ots, vigilantism, lynchings, among other forms of lawless violence).
146 "Minority offenders are sentenced to prison more often and receive longer
terms than whites convicted of similar crimes and with similar records." Charles J.
Ogletree, Does Race Matter In Criminal Prosecutions?, CHAMPION, July 1991, at 14
(citations omitted). As of February 9, 1997, "[o]nly four white defendants have been
put to death for killing black victims in the United States, while 91 black defendants
have been put to death for killing whites." Scott Richardson, Deadly Debate; Legal
Experts Differ on Capital Punishment Ban, PANTAGRAPH (Bloomington, 111.), Feb. 9,
1997, at A5; see also Randall L. Kennedy, McClerskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Pun-
ishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1391 (1988) (noting that
based on empirical research on race and capital sentencing, the state places a higher
value on the lives of whites than blacks.) This discussion of race and capital sentenc-
ing becomes particularly poignant when you also consider that prior to the 1977 case
of Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), capital punishment was permitted for rape
and traditionally reserved for black men who were convicted of raping white wo-
men. See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 107 n.2 (1987).
147 See Cover, supra note 61, at 1622-28 (discussing the "complex structure of
relationships between word and deed" in capital sentencing). It is impossible to
obscure the violence of a death sentence. Cover points out that in capital sentencing
the judge is intensely aware that he prescribes the killing of another, yet never kills
the defendants themselves. In comparison, judges often avoid the violence that con-
tinues when they do not act on the behalf of the victims of domestic violence. Social
and institutional structures have allowed the potential violence of domestic situa-
tions to be obscured. Cover also points out that the formal structure of the courts
may permit individuals to "delegate" their violent activities to others. Id. at 1615
("Persons who act within social organizations that exercise authority act violently
without experiencing the normal inhibitions or the normal degree of inhibition
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We ignore the statistical imbalance of its use where race is con-
cerned, as if it were natural and expected. 148 The most public of
state violence, war and conflict between nations, is rationalized
and minimized in its levels of violence. 49 We have discussed
wars which have spanned over years as "police actions."' 5 ° We
have denied participation in international conflicts. 151 Also, as a
means of creating the "other," we label nations and groups as
terrorists depending upon our interests or ability to empathize. 52
which regulates the behavior of those who act autonomously." (citing A. Freud,
Comments on Aggression, in PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOLOGY NORMAL DEVELOP-
MENT 161 (1981))).
148 See Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death and Denial: The Tolerance of
Racial Discrimination in Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
433, 434 (1995) (noting that "Although [African Americans] are the victims in half
of the murders that occur each year in the United States, eighty-five percent of the
condemned were sentenced to death for murder of white persons."); Erwin Chemer-
insky, Eliminating Discrimination in Administering the Death Penalty: The Need for
the Racial Justice Act, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 519 (1995); Hon. Julian A. Cook, Jr.
& Mark S. Kende, Color-Blindness in the Rehnquist Court: Comparing the Court's
Treatment of Discrimination Claims by A Black Death Row Inmate and White Voting
Rights Plaintiffs, 13 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 815 (1996). A disturbing case on this
point is the atypical capital sentencing of John William King in the Jasper, Texas
murder of James Byrd Jr. It took the brutal killing of Mr. Byrd by King and friends
chaining him by his ankles to the back of their pick-up truck and dragging him three
miles for such a sentence to be imposed. See Rick Lyman, Texas Jury Picks Death
Sentence In Fatal Dragging of a Black Man, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1999, at Al (point-
ing out that this sentencing was only the second of a white for killing a black since
1850 in Texas).
149 Chris af Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical
History of the Laws of War, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 49 (1994) (pointing out that the
rhetorical power of a "legal war," while adding to the image of a just and relatively
humane war, the laws of war have facilitated rather than restrained wartime vio-
lence, legitimizing the violence); Roger Normand & Chris af Jochnick, The Legiti-
mation of Violence: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 387
(1994) (arguing that the laws of war were drafted to subordinate humanitarian obli-
gations to military necessities and therefore legitimized wartime violence during the
Gulf War); see also James Schwoch, Cold War, Hegemony, Postmodernism: Ameri-
can Television and the World-System, 1945-1992, 14 Q. REV. FILM & VIDEO 9, 11
(1992) (pointing out that "[t]he current status of historical narration regarding
American foreign relations still tends to invariably build upon a single-factor percep-
tion of the nation-state as protagonist, either hero or antihero.").
150 See, e.g., ROBERT J. BECK, THE GRENADA INVASION: POLITICS, LAW, AND
FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONMAKING (1993) (evaluating the legality of operation "Ur-
gent Fury" under international law); W. TAYLOR REVELEY III, WAR POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: WHO HOLDS THE ARROWS AND OLIVE BRANCH?
(1981) (discussing the legacy of the Vietnam war).
151 See, e.g., LAWRENCE E. WALSH, FIREWALL: THE IRAN-CONTRA CONSPIRACY
AND COVER-UP (1997).
152 See Alpha M. Connelly, Political Violence and International Law: The Case of
Northern Ireland, 16 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 79 (1987) (discussing the claims of
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"Containment" is a nice way of saying we are forcing others to
live the way we want them to.153 International violence against
women, intertwined with racial and sexual identity are well si-
lenced 154 and are very much part of the dynamic that creates the
"other." In addition, surely we must question the legitimacy of
international violence precipitated because governments and na-
tional leaders covet economic gain. 155 The rhetoric of interna-
tional violence alone makes one wonder if our differences are an
excuse for the outlet of innate violence.
B. Private Violence
The common understanding of private violence is that which
you keep to yourself and do not talk about, something in which
the public and the state have no business interfering. 56 Like
legitimacy by both the British and the I.R.A. in their respective acts of violence); see
also Necati Polat, International Law, the Inherent Instability of the International Sys-
tem, and International Violence, 19 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1999) (postulating
that violence is inherent in international law with intervention and terrorism natural
facets of that system). Polat also describes terrorism as the sole means of recogni-
tion for counter groups and individuals within the system. Id. at 64-67; cf. Cover,
supra note 58.
153 See Louis J. HALLE, THE COLD WAR AS HISTORY 20-21 (1967) (arguing that
Americans perceive the United States as ideal and everything else as "wicked").
154 Penelope Andrews, Violence Against Aboriginal Women in Australia: Possibili-
ties for Redress Within the International Human Rights Framework, 60 ALB. L. REV.
917 (1997); Hernandez-Truyol, supra note 68; James D. Wilets, Conceptualizing Pri-
vate Violence Against Sexual Minorities as Gendered Violence: An International and
Comparative Law Perspective, 60 ALB. L. REV. 989 (1997); Adrien Katherine Wing,
A Critical Race Feminist Conceptualization of Violence: South African and Palestin-
ian Women, 60 ALB. L. REV. 943 (1997).
155 See Alex Y. Seita, The Role of Market Forces in Transnational Violence, 60
ALB. L. REV. 635 (1997) (discussing the economics of international violence, includ-
ing violent commodities and illegal goods).
156 See Siegel, supra note 10, at 2150-74 (discussing the doctrine of family
privacy).
However, the economics of private violence do affect the public and ought to be a
public concern. The costs associated with domestic abuse are potentially phenome-
nal. Such costs include: (1) direct costs (including emergency room care, hospitaliza-
tion, doctor visits, child protective services, foster care, shelters and subsidized
housing, police and court resources, counseling, and property damage); (2) indirect
costs (including job loss and unemployment, lost productivity, disruption of the work
place by the batterer, lost home production, lost promotion and advancement, loss
of control over one's environment, alienation from friends family and community,
and mortality); and (3) transfer payments (though not considered a "cost" under
economic analyses, welfare payments to victims of domestic abuse diminish the re-
sources available for other public expenditures). See generally LouISE LAURENCE
& ROBERTA M. SPALTER-RoTH, INSTITUTE FOR WOMEN'S POLICY RESEARCH,
MEASURING THE COSTS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THE COST-
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public violence, private violence is something that happens to
other people. It is discussed publicly when it becomes a matter
of celebrity, is so extreme as to be exceptional, or is committed
by "others. ' 15 7 When the association with violence is too close to
ourselves or our families, we minimize it, rename it, or ignore its
occurrences.
Family is considered antithetical to violence, a "haven"'' 58 from
the problems and violence in the outside world. Despite the very
complex nature of family relations, this characterization tends to
be our automatic assumption concerning the operation of the
family. 15 9 Nonetheless, both "haven" and "hell" may be part of
the internal reality for any one family, and any one individual
within that family.
The stereotypical family structure, as maintained by the patri-
archal structure, contributes to the dichotomy between haven
and hell. That is, the male breadwinner who goes out into the
cruel world to provide for his family is entitled to come home to
a haven created by his wife, the homemaker. In other words, the
conceptualization of the home as a haven is male-centric; it is a
haven for him. 6' Contrary to statistics, the "hell" characteriza-
tion is viewed as unusual and deviant; the violence viewed as ex-
ceptional.' 6 ' Therefore, the way we deal with private violence
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERVENTIONS: AN INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND PROPOSALS FOR
FURTHER RESEARCH (1996).
157 The trials of O.J. Simpson included many instances of exceptionalism, includ-
ing celebrity, affluence and race. See, e.g., David Margolick, Evidence is Powerful,
But He's Still O.J., N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1995, at Al (suggesting that the "mountain of
evidence" may not be enough to counteract O.J.'s celebrity status); see also Mc-
Gowen, supra note 129.
158 See FAMILY MATTERS: READINGS ON FAMILY LIVES AND THE LAW 1-2
(Martha Minow ed., 1993); see also DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 32, at 7 ("In
Western societies, the ideas of peace and security and harmony are still so strongly
associated with the institution of the family that it has been exceedingly difficult to
deal with the fact that many people are horribly abused within the home."); Siegel,
supra note 10, at 2150-74 (discussing how doctrines emerging from the demise of
marital chastisement were dependent upon "gender-neutral" notions of marital pri-
vacy to justify the continuing toleration by the law of violence in the home).
159 "Haven" ought to be the goal, rather than the assumption. If the potential for
violence within familial relationships is the initial assumption, then this goal can be
more realistically reached.
160 See supra note 29.
161 Indeed, one-third to one-half of all female murder victims are killed by a male
intimate. See RONET BACHMAN, PH.D. & LINDA E. SALTZMAN, PH.D., U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: ESTIMATES FROM THE
REDESIGNED SURVEY 1 (Aug. 1995) (noting that estimates are conservative since
"[m]any factors inhibit women from reporting these victimizations both to police
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tends to be as an exception, 162 fit into a system not designed to
deal specifically with the problems of violence in the home. 6 3
The fiction that violence is exceptional is fundamental to ste-
reotypes that portray battered women as helpless, dependent,
and pathological. If it were understood that violence is really
everywhere, then it would not be difficult to accept that vio-
lence happens to ordinary women. Individual women could
then begin to overcome their own denial of painful experi-
ence, a particularly dangerous component of broader social
denial of the prevalence and seriousness of domestic
violence.
164
and to interviewers, including the private nature of the event, the perceived stigma
associated with one's victimization, and the belief that no purpose will be served in
reporting it"); RONET BACHMAN, PH.D., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT,
SEX DIFFERENCES IN VIOLENT VICTIMIZATION, 1994, at 1 (Sept. 1997).
In addition, domestic crime against adults accounts for approximately $67 billion
per year, almost 15% of the total crime costs. TED R. MILLER ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, VICTM COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES: A NEW LOOK 19 (1996). Of all per-
sons treated for violence related injuries in U.S. hospital emergency departments,
approximately 17% were attributable to a spouse or ex-spouse, or current or former
boyfriend or girlfriend. See MICHAEL R. RAND & KEVIN STROM, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, VIOLENCE-RELATED INJURIES TREATED IN HOSPITAL EMERGENCY DE-
PARTMENTS 3 (1997) (noting that a higher percentage of women than men were
injured by someone with whom they shared an intimate relationship). Of the vio-
lence perpetrated at the workplace, women are more likely to be attacked by some-
one known to them, and five percent of all women attacked in the workplace are
victimized by a husband, ex-husband, boyfriend, or ex-boyfriend. RONET BACH-
MAN, PH.D., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE AND THEFT IN THE WORKPLACE: A
NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY (1994); see also supra notes 29-34 and
accompanying text.
16 [W]ifebeating is not, in the strictest sense of the words, a "deviant", "aber-
rant", or "pathological" act. Rather, it is a form of behavior which has
existed for centuries as an acceptable, and, indeed, a desirable part of a
patriarchal family system within a patriarchal society, and much of the ide-
ology and many of the institutional arrangements which supported the pa-
triarchy through the subordination, domination and control of women are
still reflected in our culture and our social institutions.
R. Emerson Dobash & Russell P. Dobash, Wives: The 'Appropriate' Victims of Mari-
tal Violence, 2 VICriMOLOGY 426, 427 (1978).
163 See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
164 Women's Lives, supra note 29, at 63; cf Cover, supra note 61, at 1601
("Neither legal interpretation nor the violence it occasions may be properly under-
stood apart from one another. This much is obvious, though the growing literature
that argues for the centrality of interpretive practices in law blithely ignores it.")
(referencing law and literature scholarship). This theory is further examined by
Margulies' analysis of the resonance and dissonance Cover's theory has for violence
against women. Peter Margulies, The Violence of Law and Violence Against Wo-
men, 8 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 179 (1996) ("In his focus on the state as
the source of violence, Cover neglects the more subtle, diffuse, but ubiquitous struc-




It is apparent that the diametric conceptualization of "haven"
and "hell" corresponds to the dichotomies of male/female, pub-
lic/private.' 65 Of course, the concept of "home as haven" and the
corresponding dichotomies become more complex when consid-
ering the racial dynamics of "home." Ethnic minorities often
view the home as a sanctuary from the racism without. Thus, the
violence of racism without may serve as a container for the vio-
lence of patriarchy within.166
The way in which we treat private versus public violence
makes it seem as though violence between intimates or against
family members is somehow less serious or important as violence
against strangers or non-family members. 167 This seems back-
ward, as it would be more logical to believe the breach of trust
and of any feelings of security that comes with the violence by an
intimate or family member would make its commission all the
more reprehensible. After all, domestic violence is a violent
crime where the victim lives with the perpetrator and with whom
the victim is supposed to have a relationship of trust.168 In addi-
tion, family violence has tremendous potential for self-replication
and perpetuation. It would therefore seem as important to ad-
dress family violence as any other crime.
169
In fact, it is more surprising that we do not more consistently
examine the connection between family violence and street
violence:
Violent criminals are portrayed as inhabiting a different
[socio-demographic] space than violent family members.
While a profile of the street criminal begins to emerge through
the discovery of risk factors, the violent family member re-
mains invisible. He is depicted as being anyone. He could
165 See Olsen, supra note 52.
166 For example, a common view that black battered women hold is that black
men only batter because they need a place to release the anger and frustration that
comes with dealing with a racist outside world. "[Domestic violence], like substance
abuse, crime, and unwanted adolescent pregnancy, are symptoms of living systemati-
cally deprived in a society that is designed to dominate and control third world peo-
ple." Richie, supra note 71, at 41.
167 Hotaling et al., supra note 40, at 326 ("[S]ome evidence suggests that violence
against family members may be very similar in important respects to violence
against nonfamily persons.").
168 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
169 "The learning theory approach to family violence contends that the family
serves as a training ground for violence. In terms of modeling, the family provides
examples for imitation that can be adopted in later life as the individual draws from
childhood experiences to structure appropriate parent or conjugal roles." Hotaling
et al., supra note 40, at 327.
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possess some of the characteristics of the street criminal, but
that is not seen in the research literature as setting him apart.
His distinctiveness resides in his ability to avoid sociological
labels. If those who assault other family members are de-
picted as otherwise law-abiding citizens, there is no compelling
reason to apply notions of criminality to explain their
behavior.
170
There is some evidence that family assault victimization is linked
to other antisocial behavior and violence towards non-family
members. 171 The diametric conceptualization of violence as pub-
lic and private reinforces the silence by dividing who may be la-
beled a criminal by his status and the nature of the crime. The
silence about private violence allows us to ignore it as if it did not
exist. Thus, it becomes a tool in that violence.
Also, given the use of the dichotomous conceptualization of
violence to create and perpetuate the "other," and its use to
maintain a silence concerning private violence, it should be no
surprise that women of color and other "others" in abusive rela-
tionships would have many complex barriers to overcome in pro-
tecting themselves and in obtaining justice.172 Stereotypes
creating "others" are very public, imbedding such concepts in the
public consciousness, in opposition to concepts of self.17 3 In fact,
public portrayals of private violence through media images are
removed from normative conceptualizations and tend to indicate
that domestic violence is primarily found in areas of uneducated
urban poor.
7 4
Acknowledging the potential for violence within family rela-
170 Id. at 323.
171 Id. at 352, 364-65. Other sources suggest that intra-family violence is learned
behavior. See, e.g., STRAUS ET AL., supra note 40, at 121-22.
172 Ammons, supra note 93 (discussing the experiences in the justice system of
black women who have been battered); Kimberld Williams Crenshaw, Panel Presen-
tation on Cultural Battery, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 891 (1995); Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Map-
ping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of
Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1242 (1993); Fenton, supra note 10; Richie, supra
note 71; Rimonte, supra note 72; see also Evan Stark, Mandatory Arrest of Batterers:
A Reply to Its Critics, 36 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 651, 675 (1993) ("Whereas
racial bias generally leads to greater arrests of [bilacks than [w]hites for equivalent
crimes, particularly for [b]lack youths, the effects in domestic violence cases are
more complicated, perhaps because service to [bilack women as well as punishment
of [b]lack men is involved.").
173 See supra note 137.
174 See Consalvo, supra note 37, at 205-09 (discussing the formation of popular
images of domestic violence without directly implicating race or ethnic origin, but
suggesting its relation to image formation).
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tionships may be the first step in realistically approaching the
problems of family violence. 175  "Like all other social units or
systems, the family is a power system. All [power systems] rest
to some degree on force or its threat, whatever else may be their
foundations. 1' 76 Force, within the power dynamic of the social
relationship, plays a role, even when no deviant act is actually
committed. 77 It is only when there is a deviant act (or a per-
ceived one) when force is most literally realized.
If our starting point in understanding the nature of violence
were of the natural existence of violence and an expectation of
power differentials within relationships, our chosen solutions to
family problems, and all social relationships in general, would be
different.171 We need to change the direction of the discourse.
We ought to stop treating violence as exceptional and as some-
thing we need only deal in its extreme manifestations. We need
to understand that the potential for violence is part of human
reality and is a phenomenon we should deal with on a more com-
175 See RICHARD J. GELLES & MURRAY A. STRAUS, INTIMATE VIOLENCE 42
(1988) (discussing that violence within a family involves a system of human interac-
tions, not just a single wrong-doer); see also STRAUS ET AL., supra note 40, at 4
("[T]he American family and the American home are perhaps as or more violent
than any other single American institution or setting .... "); Separation, supra note
29; Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work
and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 195,
197, 220 (1986).
176 William J. Goode, Force and Violence in the Family, 33 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
624 (1971) (acknowledging that no system is based on force alone). "In our effort to
gain compliance we may offer both a reward-love, respect, or money-and a threat
of force, and we know that the latter will be one of the variables influencing the
decision." Id. at 625; see also Murray A. Straus, A General Systems Theory Ap-
proach to a Theory of Violence Between Family Members, Soc. ScI. INFO., June 1973,
at 105 (developing a theory, with the understanding that the empirical data leaves no
doubt that violence between family members is so common as to be almost univer-
sal, which views continuing violence as a systemic product rather than a product of
individual behavior pathology).
177 Goode, supra note 176, at 625 (explaining role of force in the socialization of
families). See generally SUZANNE K. STEINMETZ, DUTY BOUND: ELDER ABUSE AND
FAMILY CARE (1988) (examining family relationship patterns and abuse as a means
of control maintenance); Schneider, supra note 29, at 545-48 (discussing the nuanced
treatment of elder abuse not always accorded other kinds of abuse). Cf Cover,
supra note 58, at 25 ("[I]n the domain of legal meaning, it is force and violence that
are problematic.").
178 Power and control is so natural to the structure of family relations that on a
continuum violence and domestic abuse are expected. See Goode, supra note 176,
at 625; cf CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE
STATE 126-54, 171-83 (1989) (implying that because of sex inequality all sex is rape
or may be perceived as such); see also Hartsock, supra note 98, at 170-72 (suggesting
a transformation of power relations).
[Vol. 78, 1999]
Mirrored Silence
prehensive basis. The judiciary, as a legitimizing force, must
have a role in this change.
C. Legitimate Violence and the Legitimization of Violence
In discussing our conceptualizations of violence, our under-
standing of when violence is legitimate is essential.179 In turn,
our conceptualization of legitimacy rests on authority and who
may properly wield it. As described by Robert Paul Wolff, au-
thority may be contrasted with power in that it is a right, not an
ability. Thus, to be possessed of authority is what differentiates
legitimate and illegitimate uses of force.' 80 The state may com-
mand compliance by right and may influence future outcomes by
establishing binding precedent; parents may claim the right to be
obeyed by their children and husbands may claim the right to be
obeyed by their wives, but are not necessarily justified in these
claims nor in the wielding of force to enforce such claims. 8 To
the extent we believe there is no authority for anyone to adminis-
ter physical abuse182 within an intimate/family relationship, we
may further redefine domestic abuse as an issue of power and
control.183 The mere exertion of might does not confer authority
and therefore may not be legitimate. A batterer has the might,
but not the right to abuse.
For authority to be legitimate, the appropriate individual must
wield it. For example, a judge creates social meaning through the
written opinion, backed by the authority of the state. 18 4 Owen
Fiss gives two reasons for the uniquely authoritative position of
the judge: 1) "it legitimates the use of force against those who
refuse to accept or otherwise give effect to the meaning embod-
ied in that interpretation" and 2) "an individual has a moral duty
179 "Legitimacy is thus the minimal answer to skeptical questions about the ways
law's violence differs from the turmoil and disorder law is allegedly brought into
being to conquer." LAW'S VIOLENCE, supra note 9, at 4 (citing WOLFF, supra note
128)).
180 WOLFF, supra note 128, at 54, 56.
181 See id. at 57.
182 See supra note 40.
l8 31he threat that battering poses to traditional notions of the family is even
more profound when battering is redefined as an issue of power and con-
trol, rather than physical abuse. Individuals who have to confront their
own feelings of family can distance themselves more easily when the issue
is physical abuse, rather than personal domination.
Schneider, supra note 29, at 539.
184 We all create or destroy meaning, but only state officials have the authority
(and the violence) to back up their interpretation. See Cover. supra note 58, at 25.
OREGON LAW REVIEW
to obey a judicial interpretation... because the judge is part of
an authority structure that is good to preserve. ' 185 The comple-
ment to this authority is responsibility to wield it in the pursuit of
justice so that such authority is good to preserve.
Human beings have a need to create and interpret texts.
186
Each of us attaches different significance to the same text or situ-
ation. For example, "all Americans share a national text in the
first or thirteenth or fourteenth amendment, but we do not share
an authoritative narrative regarding its significance."
' 187
Ascribed authority confers a privileged hermeneutic, in this case,
on the judiciary. 188 It is necessary in the justice system for a priv-
ileged interpretation of the text to exist, 89 for the sake of con-
tinuity and predictability. For this reason, it is that much more
important that the position of the law and its interpreters explore
how the text is interpreted by the different actors in establishing
the most equitable interpretation. So, for example, in a battering
situation, the position and interpretation of the victim, the bat-
terer, secondary victims such as child-witnesses, and actors in the
chain of justice, including the police, the prosecutor, and even
the judge ought to be considered.
When the courts use their authority, they have the power to
alter the balance of power between individuals in a manner that
might equalize, thereby conditioning the environment for an end
to the violence. 90
We usually think of law's violence as emanating from orders of
185 Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 755-56
(1982) (emphasis added).
186 Cover, supra note 58, at 40.
187 Id. at 17.
181T]he statist position may be understood to assert implicitly, not a superior
interpretive method, but a convention of legal discourse: the state and its
designated hierarchy are entitled to the exclusive or supreme jurisgenera-
tive capacity. Everyone else offers suggestions or opinions about what the
single normative world should look like, but only the state creates it .... It
encourages us to think that the interpretive act of the court is privileged in
the measure of its political ascendance.
Id. at 42-43.
189 In the area of domestic abuse, not only is the system working backward ideo-
logically (punishing the victim while ameliorating the perpetrator), its function in
doing so inflicts pain more intense than that generally inflicted by the system be-
cause of its inappropriateness. Cover points out that "[t]he violence of the act of
sentencing is most obvious when observed from the defendant's perspective."
Cover, supra note 61, at 1608. It then should follow that the violence perpetuated
by a non-act would be most obvious when observed from the victim's perspective.
190 See Hartsock, supra note 98.
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the court. But there may be equally violent consequences in
the law's refusal to mediate certain disputes, leaving the par-
ties to fend for themselves. By denying its offices, the law may
affect the balance of power between individuals and, in certain
circumstances, may actively encourage or legitimize violence
by one toward the other.19"
Judges make rulings that order society; their silence may be abdi-
cation of judicial responsibility that permits delegation to a non-
legitimate actor.192 In the case of Person, the normative world
was created by the batterer, reaffirmed by the state, and resisted
by the victim. Only the Judge had the authority and was in a
position to counter the literal violence and create peace.193 We
might ask whether authority is maintainable when the corre-
sponding responsibility is not upheld.1 94 Authority cannot be le-
gitimate when its holder refuses or does not use it for justice.
195
III
WRITTEN REPRESENTATION AND BREAKING THE
SILENCE: THE JUDICIAL ROLE
The creation of legal meaning cannot take place in silence.
191 Wald, supra note 9, at 94 ("[B]ut it is surely possible to say that centuries of
experience with the law's refusal to invoke its violence in the case of battered wives
has only resulted in greater, not less, violence inflicted on these hapless women.");
see also Bright, supra note 148, at 439-42 (discussing lynching as the precursor to the
death penalty). Lynching is a public extra-legal form of control. Domestic violence
can also be viewed as an extra-legal form of control, in private. Even if not dis-
cussed as acceptable, are these forms of control not expected? Does the judiciary
take a convenient blind eye to these matters? Cf. COVER, supra note 13, at 8-30
(explaining how before 1850 judges could have fashioned legal arguments for the
abolition of slavery, despite doctrinal opposition). Does this mode of operation con-
stitute complicity?
192 Cf Elaine Scarry, The Declaration of War: Constitutional and Unconstitutional
Violence, in LAw's VIOLENCE, supra note 9, at 23 (discussing executive orders of
"police actions").
193 See Cover, supra note 58, at 53.
194 "For the law's violence to be legitimate, it must have roots in the law itself-
not in the law's refusal to stop lawless violence inflicted in its name." Wald, supra
note 9, at 86 (discussing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991), an Eighth Amendment
case concerning prison conditions and abuse).
195 For an indictment of nations for inappropriate uses of authority, see AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, 1999 ANNUAL REPORT, REGIONAL SUMMARY FOR THE AMERICAS
(highlighting abuses such as "abuses by US police and prison officials, the arbitrary,
unfair and racist use of the death penalty, the growing incarceration of asylum seek-
ers and the USA's double standards regarding foreign policy and international
human rights," and adding that "[d]espite its claim to international leadership in
human rights the USA continued to fail to respect the fundamental promise of rights
for all - both at home and abroad").
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But neither can it take place without the committed action
that distinguishes law from literature.
196
Activists attempt to fill the silence through narrative,197 both
in traditional forms of literature such as novels and short sto-
ries,1 98 and in the use of narrative in law review articles, courses
196 Cover, supra note 58, at 49.
197 Addressing the "silences" or the omission of women's voices and stories from
historical and literary texts has been an important task of feminists. See JACQUE-
LINE JONES, LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW (1985) (discussing the silences in
history concerning black women); ADRIENNE RICH, ON LIES, SECRETS, AND SI-
LENCE 11 (1979):
The entire history of women's struggle for self-determination has been
muffled in silence over and over. One serious cultural obstacle encoun-
tered by any feminist writer is that each feminist work has tended to be
received as if it emerged from nowhere; as if each of us had lived, thought,
and worked without any historical past or contextual present.
See also Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It, Anyway?: Feminist and Antiracist
Appropriations of Anita Hill, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER 402
(Toni Morrison ed., 1992) (noting that women's voices are often omitted from race
theories); GERDA LERNER, THE CREATION OF FEMINIST CONSCIOUSNESS: FROM
THE MIDDLE AGES TO EIGHTEEN-SEVENTY (1993) (examining the ways in which
patriarchy has created the silence of women and the ways in which women have
found a voice, despite institutional restraints); GERDA LERNER, THE CREATION OF
PATRIARCHY (1986) (discussing women's relationship to the making of history); Nel-
lie Y. McKay, The Souls of Black Women Folk in the Writings of W.E.B. Dubois, in
READING BLACK, READING FEMINIST: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 227 (Henry Louis
Gates, Jr. ed., 1990) (noting the silence in autobiographies on activities other than
work: the personal, the affairs of women and children, the home, and family, dis-
cusses how these silences contribute to the dichotomy of personal vs. professional.);
Deborah Gray White, Private Lives, Public Personae: A Look at Early Twentieth-
Century African American Clubwomen, in TALKING GENDER (Nancy A. Hewitt et
al. eds., 1996) (discussing how African American women tended to include only
public information about themselves in autobiographies to avoid slander and stere-
otyping of their private lives); JOAN WALLACH SCOTT, GENDER AND THE POLITICS
OF HISTORY 15-27 (1988) (addressing Virgina Wolf's call for a history of women and
the approaches developed to rewrite history inclusive of women); Angela P. Harris,
Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990) (not-
ing that race is often omitted from feminist theories); Darren Lenard Hutchinson,
Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory and Political
Discourse, 29 CONN. L. REV. 561 (1997) (pointing out the subordination of poor and
people of color in gay and lesbian politics and legal theory); Francisco Valdes, Be-
yond Sexual Orientation in Queer Legal Theory: Majoritarianism, Multidisciplinary,
and Responsibility in Social Justice Scholarship or Legal Scholars as Cultural War-
riors, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1409 (1998) (discussing how the inclusion of sexual ori-
entation has expanded the breadth of legal scholarship).
198 See, e.g., RAMSEY CAMPBELL, THE ONE SAFE PLACE (1997); GLORIA NAY-
LOR, LINDEN HILLS (1985); PAULA SHARP, CROWS OVER A WHEATFIELD (1996);
MARY BURNETT SMITH, RING AROUND THE MOON (1998); MARK SPILKA, EIGHT
LESSONS IN LOVE: A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE READER (1997); ALICE WALKER, THE
THIRD LIFE OF GRANGE COPELAND (1970); see also ERIN PRIZZEY, SCREAM QUI-
ETLY OR THE NEIGHBORS WILL HEAR (1974); Emily Detmer, Civilizing Subordina-
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and case books.19 9 These media are extremely useful in ex-
panding the legal imagination and in educating lawmakers to ad-
dress real, existing problems."° Activism in domestic violence
has increased public awareness, promoted changes in public re-
sponses, and led to the development of the Battered Woman
Syndrome as a judicially recognized victim's response in abusive
relationships. Narrative is important in the activists' mission.
The ultimate goal of activists, no matter how radical their agen-
das may be perceived at inception, is to effectuate change in
mainstream, normative understandings. Activists ultimately
want their stories to be told in the legislatures, the judiciary, and
to become central to the understandings underlying media repre-
sentations. Activists' efforts are only one piece in the chain of
justice. Their efforts are aimed at all actors in the chain, includ-
ing the victim, the batterer, the community, the police, the prose-
tion: Domestic Violence and the Taming of the Shrew, 48 SHAKESPEARE Q. 273, 274
(1997) (suggesting that "[t]o enjoy the comedy of the play, readers and viewers must
work to see domestic violence from the point of view of an abuser" and that "the
play signals a shift toward a 'modern' way of managing the subordination of wives
by legitimizing domination as long as it is not physical"); Angela Mae Kupenda,
Law, Life, and Literature: A Critical Reflection of Life and Literature to Illuminate
How Laws of Domestic Violence, Race, and Class Bind Black Women, 42 How. L.J.
1 (1998).
199 Marie Ashe, The "Bad Mother" in Law and Literature: A Problem of Repre-
sentation, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1017 (1992) (suggesting uses of literature in clinical edu-
cation to help students understand the perspective of their clients); Richard
Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH.
L. REV. 2411 (1989) (demonstrating how counter stories by members of "outgroups"
are useful in exploring the stories created by the dominant group); Jacqueline St.
Joan, Sex, Sense, and Sensibility: Trespassing Into the Culture of Domestic Abuse, 20
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 263 (1997) (arguing for the use of literature and empirical
research to educate judges about domestic abuse); see also Elizabeth Villiers Gem-
mette, Law and Literature: An Unnecessarily Suspect Class in the Liberal Arts Com-
ponent of the Law School Curriculum, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 267 (1989); Minow, supra
note 13, at 1689 (discussing a project of continuing legal education for judges in
which family violence is discussed using works of fiction); Judy Scales-Trent, Using
Literature in Law School: The Importance of Reading and Telling Stories, 7 BERKE-
LEY WOMEN'S L.J. 90 (1992). But see Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling
Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993)
(questioning the extent of the usefulness of narratives in legal scholarship).
200 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Power of Narrative in Empathetic Learning:
Post-Modernism and the Stories of Law, 2 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 287, 304-05 (1992)
(reviewing PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991))
(discussing how narrative can move us away from abstraction through the power of
empathy); Carol Weisbrod, Divorce Stories: Readings, Comments and Questions on
Law and Narrative, 1991 BYU L. REV. 143, 184 (arguing that the power of narrative
is in its ability to affect those who will shape the law).
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cutor, advocates and the judiciary.2"1 Within the chain, activists
are not the only ones who can tell stories to effectuate change.2 °2
Judicial story telling can play a major role in effectuating
change. "[W]riting is 'a form of violence in its own right'; read-
ing and speaking too are implicated in power, in that they are
exclusive, in that they necessarily reconstruct the world 'around
the polarities of Self and Other.""'2 3 What judges write changes
the tenor of the dialogue and the actions of all other actors in
society, bringing these issues to the "public.""2 4 The prosecutor,
police, community, batterer and victim ultimately take their cues
from the judiciary. Judicial opinions may be only one part in the
realization of justice, but it is a very important part and the final
step in legitimate norms.
Unfortunately, there are dangers in asking for stories to be
told by the judiciary. It is always possible that these stories will
be poorly told or manipulated for injustice.20 5 Judges are a
human element like any other. Their biases and personal experi-
ence will color the ways in which they tell the story. "Standpoint"
or "social location, 20 6 affects the narrator and the telling of the
story. Ironically, the same social factors that affect the judged
also affect the judger. This point may be the greatest practical
barrier to transforming the laws and norms affecting domestic vi-
olence. Nonetheless, full dialogue is not possible in silence.
20 7
201 See supra notes 39-49 and accompanying text. In states which devote more
resources to domestic abuse, there are lower rates of homicide committed by the
women abused. Angela Browne & Kirk R. Williams, Exploring the Effect of Re-
source Availability and the Likelihood of Female-Perpetrated Homicides, 23 L. &
Soc'y REV. 75 (1989).
202 Victims must tell their stories. Batterers might help each other through sto-
ries. Members of the community may prevent further violence by retelling stories.
Litigation is itself a story-telling medium in seeking the truth. See supra Part I.
203 Restuccia, supra note 38, at 43 ("[W]henever we speak for someone else[,] we
are inscribing her with our own (implicitly masculine) idea of order.").
204 Cf George Wattendorf, Focus on Domestic Violence: Prosecuting Cases With-
out Victim Cooperation, FBI L. ENFORCEMENTr BULL., Apr. 1996, at 18, 20 ("Such
proactive efforts on the part of the criminal justice system send a clear message to
potential abusers. At the very least, the real threat of prosecution may deter some
offenders. At best, courts can use the threat of jail time to divert abusers into treat-
ment programs.").
205 See Minow, supra note 13, at 1672-77 (discussing Deshaney v. Winnebago
County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989), and the possibility of
injustice through words).
206 Social location includes the categories of race ethnicity, class, age, sexual ori-
entation, religion, and gender. Personal history and other factors may also be rele-
vant to their social location.
207 Much like mandatory arrest, full dialogue may not be appropriate in every
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Regardless of any new problems that may occur with asking for
more public statements and writings by the judiciary, discussion
and debate are a better means of moving towards change than
silence.
Appeals to the judiciary may be an imperfect solution because,
as an institution, it is part of the patriarchal structure reinforcing
male domination in the family.2"8 The judiciary is also part of a
system with a long history of racism and bias towards certain seg-
ments of the population.2"9 With the understanding of the exist-
ence of institutional and individual biases, the potential that
asking for a more active role by the judiciary could, at times, op-
erate as a tool of oppression, needs to be addressed. The judicial
system is no panacea for social problems, but it surely must be an
integral part of the solutions. The judge may be singularly well
positioned to effectuate such changes. Despite the possibility
that a particular judge may not tell stories as would best comport
with justice, in the least there would be a possibility for response
and the dialogue necessary for change. The judiciary has been an
active participant in creating the silence in our history; it is time it
becomes part of the means of breaking that silence. In scholar-
ship that examines the relationship of law and literature in dis-
cerning the meaning of the text, 210 questions of canon, who is
given voice and who is marginalized and ignored, are most often
situation, but is better than a do-nothing approach. See SHERMAN ET AL., supra
note 41; Hanna, supra note 41 (arguing that mandated participation is a better pol-
icy choice than dismissing a case, while acknowledging the costs, such as the risk of
infringing on a woman's sense of autonomy); Schulhofer, supra note 30, at 2162-70
(discussing the problems of a mandatory approach in dealing with all situations that
could be alleviated through contextual responses and real enforcement).
208 Cf SHERMAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 32-34 (noting that in addition to institu-
tional inertia, police departments often have batterers within their ranks, about
which the instituion prefers to be silent).
209 Cf. id. at 3, 148, 157 ("For most whites, arrests are seen as the rightful action of
'the law'; for many blacks, arrests may be perceived as part of a continuing pattern
of racial discrimination and harassment.").
210 Legal theorists, in focusing on interpretivism or its relationship to political re-
ality, have discussed the Constitution as the primary text. In doing so, they have
kept the dialogue at a high level of abstraction, obscuring the relationship between
personal experiences of disempowerment and oppression, and broader political ac-
tion and consequences. Abstraction gives the appearance of objectivity and tends to
be the preferred "male" approach. See supra note 23. Context is the only way one
can truly be objective. Case law and the development of the common law have the
most direct effects on the lives of individuals. Heilbrun & Resnik, supra note 2,
1937-40. For these reasons, Person and Kheyfets are discussed as background in this
Article.
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neglected.211 There can be no interpretation of the text if it has
not been written. The choice in what not to write is as powerful
as what is written.
The formalistic, normative formulation of the law is based on a
"story," a situation anticipated by the legislature in promulgating
a particular set of rules. 212 Litigation is itself a process of truth
seeking, whereby each side presents its version of the facts, com-
posing a story for the jury to accept or not accept.213 The discre-
tion in deciding which stories to write (and how to write them) is
dependent upon the law's objectivity rather than actual con-
text.214 Therefore legal norms continue to be based on the stere-
otypical, rather than the specifics within a situation. As Sanford
Levinson points out, the rhetoric of judicial opinions is tailored
to demonstrate the authority over that which they speak. In
some instances, this rhetoric permits the author of the judicial
opinion to assert authority, while simultaneously relieving him of
responsibility.215 Judges must make a moral commitment,21 6 not
211 Heilbrun & Resnik, supra note 2, at 1936 ("[R]elatively little attention has
been paid to the question of the canon-who is given voice, who cited, quoted, re-
peated, and who marginalized, ignored, submerged"); see also RUTH COLKER, HY-
BRID: BISEXUALS, MULTIRACIALS, AND OTHER MISFITS UNDER AMERICAN LAW
(1996) (discussing identity as it crosses socially constructed categories); Deborah L.
Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617 (1990) (citations omitted)
(describing the relationship between critical legal studies and feminism as problem-
atic and suggests that the "'woman question' perpetuates a tradition of tokenism
that has long characterized left political movements"); Patricia J. Williams, Alchemi-
cal Notes: Reconstructing Ideals From Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 401 (1987) (pointing out how critical legal studies tends to ignore the voices of
blacks, other minorities and the poor in their critiques of rights analyses).
212 See Cover, supra note 58.
213 See, e.g., Robert A. Ferguson, Untold Stories in the Law, in LAw's STORIES:
NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 84 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds.,
1996) [hereinafter LAw's STORIES]; Robert Weisberg, Proclaiming Trials as Narra-
tives: Premises and Pretenses, in LAw's STORIES, supra, at 61.
214 See generally Heilbrun & Resnik, supra note 2.
215 See Sanford Levinson, The Rhetoric of the Judicial Opinion, in LAw's STORIES,
supra note 213, at 187; see also COVER, supra note 13, at 119 (pointing out that the
rhetorical function of the judicial opinion, while intended to relate to the law, in fact
operates as self-justification: "[O]ccasionally one finds the judicial opinion used to
suggest the immorality of the law. Very often this suggestion is coupled with a state-
ment that the judge is, nevertheless, bound to apply the law, immoral as it may be.");
Caroline J. Howlett, Writing on the Body? Representation and Resistance in British
Suffragette Accounts of Forcible Feeding, in BODIES OF WRITING, BODIES IN PER-
FORMANCE, supra note 38, at 3, 4 ("I suggest, then, that it is not that pain is resistant
to representation, but that representation is resistant to pain.").
216 See Restuccia, supra note 38, at 69 (determining that we must take responsibil-
ity for the violence and pain).
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just hide behind the formality of the law.
Representation, through the written word, has the ability to
address the violence as a means of resistance and to be a mode of
empowerment to end it. The choice of how and what to repre-
sent, might compound the violence and intensify the pain exper-
ienced.217 Courts must not only take responsibility to write the
stories, but must also endeavor to do so from the perspective of
concrete individuals. 18 There should at least be an attempt to
convey the real experiences of women, through the development
of the facts, and not mere reliance on abstraction in the cold ap-
plication of rules. "Lawyers for subordinated people have a spe-
cial obligation not to replicate the silencing of subordination.,
219
Courts also have an obligation to strive for a structure that does
not contribute to that silencing.
Literature and narrative have attempted to fill the gap and tell
the stories that are neglected by the law. 220 However, as many
critics of "law as literature" point out, literature lacks the author-
ity of law and therefore does not have the same ability to coerce
actors in society. 221 There are many distinctions between great
(and not so great) literary works and precedent establishing (or
reaffirming) legal opinions. Literature uses facts as the founda-
tion in creating a story, which although often a depiction of real-
ity, is a work of fiction. Legal opinions use facts as the
217 See, e.g., Heilbrun & Resnik, supra note 2 (discussing the characterization of
what was left out of the story in Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961)).
218 If we consider that the criminal laws are written to protect society and address
wrongs against it, they are generally written for the benefit of the wronged. Thus, it
would follow that, while taking into account protection of the defendant's rights, the
application of the law should consider the victim's perspective in enduring the
wrong. See Cahn, supra note 16.
219 Margulies, supra note 164, at 185 (discussing why decision-making ought to
remain with the client). Courts should also respect the voices of the parties affected.
220 Heilbrun & Resnik, supra note 2, at 1918-19, point out that "[a] first premise
of feminist conversations is that we begin with the actual experiences of women.
The realities of women's lives are central to feminist description, analysis and the-
ory." With this as the premise, this Article asks for these stories to be told so that
the conversation can be had. Activists for law reform often employ the technique of
story telling to demonstrate the legal system's inadequate response to the human
dimension of the problem. See Jane C. Murphy, Lawyering for Social Change: The
Power of the Narrative in Domestic Violence Law Reform, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1243
(1993).
221 See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELA-
TION (1988) (critiquing law and literature and discussing its shortcomings); Robin L.
West, Adjudication is Not Interpretation: Some Reservations About the Law-As-
Literature Movement, 54 TENN. L. REV. 203 (1987); see also James Boyd White, Law
as Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 415, 434 (1982).
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foundation in establishing law and in applying appropriate doc-
trine.222 Literature is a reflection of society through the power of
common experience and universal themes. Law molds society
through the power of authority.223 Law coerces; literature does
not. Law has the power to shape norms; literature might also,
but not with the same power. 224 Therefore, the judiciary must
take the responsibility to tell these stories. "[T]he jurisgenerative
impulse that compels the creation of law by forcing the court to
grapple with substantive issues" is only possible if the court deals
with the facts as they affect human beings.225
The courts have the power to transform the power dynamic
within the relationship that conditions the violence.226 Courts
have a choice of aligning their power congruent with the domi-
nant ideology, in this case, the patriarchal structure, or aligning
their power with the object of violence to alter the power dy-
namic.227 One might suggest that this choice is a political one,
repugnant to the law. However, the false rupture between law
and politics inures from a traditional construct of the law as iso-
lated from politics as ideology. Once law is defined as apolitical,
it becomes difficult to consider the politics involved in determin-
ing what is written as law in the form of an opinion.228 Thus,
222 The definition of a fact in this discussion and comparison is an illusive one.
One might suggest that facts in a legal proceeding differ from those used in literature
in that they are more readily ascertainable and provable. However, because the
system is itself a means of seeking the truth, generally with more than one version of
facts, this is not necessarily so. Literature might be regarded as fanciful and pure
fiction. However, the work of Sir Philip Sidney states that literature creates a
"golden world," a better, truer, and nobler reality, whereas discourses that convey
facts deal in baser realities. See generally SIR PHILIP SIDNEY, THE APOLOGY FOR
POETRY (Mary R. Mahl ed., 1969).
223 See White, supra note 221 (noting the fundamental differences between law
and literature).
224 This is not to deny the importance of narrative in expanding the legal imagina-
tion and the perspectives that comprise that "universal" standpoint of the law. See
supra note 188.
225 See Cover, supra note 58, at 56; see also Cahn, supra note 16.
226 Hartsock, supra note 98, at 170-72 (suggesting a "transformation" of power
relations ... ).
227 A distinction must be made between literature complicit in battering and that
which works on behalf of battered victims, literature that fights back. Restuccia,
supra note 38, at 45 ("Not to make such a distinction is like equating batterers who
destroy their victims with victims who defend themselves by destroying their
batterers.").
228 Cf Stephanie Jed, The Scene of Tyranny: Violence and the Humanistic Tradi-
tion, in THE VIOLENCE OF REPRESENTATION, supra note 38, at 29, 35 (examining
the superficial rupture between literature and politics).
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without a completed choice, we have a reaffirmation of the poli-
tics of silence.
Robert Cover, in his brilliant work, Nomos and Narrative, de-
scribes how in our normative universe, a nomos, law and narra-
tive are inseparable.229  Cover reasons that it is insular
communities, groups within society, which "establish their own
meanings for constitutional principles through their constant
struggle to define and maintain the independence and authority
of their nomos. ''230 In contrast, within the domain of legal mean-
ing, "force and violence are problematic,"' 231  making
"[i]nterpretation always [take] place in the shadow of coer-
cion. ' 232 Cover does not accept that any one nomos or herme-
neutic methodology is superior to another, but points out that a
convention of legal discourse is that only the state creates our
single normative world.233
The initial choice in deciding which is the sustainable nomos,
that is, our common story, determines the outcome moreso than
any other interim choice.23 4 When the story before the court
does not fit within traditional norms, the court has two choices:
(1) ignore the alternative nomoi to the extent they do not fit
within the traditional; or (2) tell the story supporting the alterna-
tive nomoi to discover just solutions for that situation. Peter
Margulies discusses the work of Robert Cover and these alterna-
tives and suggests that "[f]rom a Coverian point of view, courts
which balk at recognizing alternative nomoi are 'jurispathic;' i.e.,
they kill law. ' 235 By not recognizing alternative stories and alter-
native means of obtaining justice, courts reinforce systems con-
trary to truth and justice. Forcing law to fit a situation where it
does not, does violence to the experience of both the victim and
229 Cover, supra note 58.
230 Id. at 25.
231 Id.
232 Id. at 40.
233 Id. at 42-43. In discussing the uniquely authoritative position of judicial inter-
pretation, Cover cites the work of Owen Fiss. Id. at 43.
234 We read what is most familiar to us and give it the most credence. See Jed,
supra note 228, at 38 ("The intelligibility of the tyrant's message, for example, de-
pends upon its reference to a code shared by tyrants."); Cover, supra note 61, at
1608 (discussing sentencing from the perspective of the defendant: "[T]he function
of ideology is much more significant in justifying an order to those who principally
benefit from it and who must defend it than it is in hiding the nature of the order
from those who are its victims."); Heilbrum & Resnick, supra note 2, at 1941
("[TIhe texts of the powerful and the readers of the powerful.").
235 Margulies, supra note 164, at 183 (emphasis added).
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the perpetrator. Telling the stories that demonstrate the exist-
ence of alternative nomoi and alternative systems of justice, the
law becomes jurisgenerative, creating justice.
In situations where courts do not recognize alternative nomoi
and administer justice accordingly, it creates a void in which the
courts are no longer the sole safeguards of justice.236 In other
words, where the courts are jurispathic, jurisgeneration might be
taken on by someone within an alternative nomoi.2 37 Feminist
lawyers have wisely avoided the claim that their battered clients
who kill are creating their own law. Nonetheless, this is the per-
ception created when their nomos is not recognized and vali-
dated by the stories told by the courts. Thus, structurally there is
a double bind for victims of domestic abuse. By not including
victims' stories, the law diminishes their ability to find justice in
the courts, and if these women seek an alternative means of jus-
tice they risk the imposition of law's violence upon themselves.
238
236 "[T]he courts have been compelled to deal with the cases of homicidal self-
help that have followed upon the granting of a class-based exemption for domestic
assailants." Marcus, supra note 86, at 1658. The reference to "homicidal self-help"
is from the case, State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 15 (N.C. 1989). See Separation,
supra note 29, at 92; Margulies, supra note 164, at 183.
Instances of civil disobedience are analogous here, especially if we extend the
Filmerian trope to its furthest boundaries. See PATEMAN, supra note 5; see, e.g.,
ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, NEGROES WITH GUNS (Marc Schleifer ed., 1962) (discussing
how, in the context of widespread human rights abuse against African Americans,
the black community's policy of self-defense developed and local activists concluded
that they had to "meet violence with violence").
237 Robert Cover describes the "ways insular communities establish their own
meanings ... through their constant struggle to define and maintain the indepen-
dence and authority of their nomos." Cover, supra note 58, at 25. Though Cover's
concept of insular communities is more broadly defined in a national context, the
counter actions of victims in the context of family also fits this definition. See id. at
26-40.
In discussing Nomos and Narrative, Michael Ryan examines how alternative com-
munities, like the Nazis, could become the state, with legal expression and ascen-
dency over all others. Michael Ryan, Meaning and Alternity, in NARRATIVE,
VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 267 (Martha Minow et
al. eds., 1992). Extending the Filmerian trope, this is certainly possible within the
family, with the unfortunate consequence of affirmation by the state and society by
the means of status. See PATEMAN, supra note 5.
238 Where capital punishment is already a problematic proposition, it becomes
more problematic when its imposition is contemplated on the women who "take the
law into their own hands" out of necessity for lack of viable alternatives within the
system.
In comparison to the number of men executed and on death row, women in a
similar position are rare. See Kathleen Daly & Michael Tonry, Gender, Race, and
Sentencing, 22 CRIME & JUST. 201, 202 (1997) (indicating that just over one percent
of those on death row in 1993 were female). Thus, meaningful analysis of the reasons
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In comparison, there is no need for jurisgeneration where the
perspective is already embodied, as in the case of the provoca-
tion defense.239
If the law of self-defense is predicated on a single norm, as
earlier suggested, alternative stories also validly indicating a need
for self-defense by the reasonable person in such circumstances
may be excluded. The act of self-defense is itself a literal telling
of an alternative story through action contrary to that of the bat-
terer. Perhaps by giving voice to those who need to defend
themselves through the telling of their stories, there would be
less need for those stories to be told through action.
It may be questionable whether writing the full story to affect
justice is really within the purview of the judiciary. Why should
the courts document facts that are not directly relevant or essen-
tial to the law presented in a case? Shouldn't this task be taken
on by the legislature? There can be no absolute answers to these
questions. The judiciary is perhaps in the best position to tell the
stories on a case-by-case basis that would provide the predicate
for new legislation.24 °
Many advocate an activist court to the extent of believing
judges have the right, and even the responsibility, to write law.
On the other extreme, some think the judiciary should have little
or no role in the creation of law, leaving that function solely to
the legislature. However, the judiciary has historically had a sig-
nificant role in law-making. The common law was the means
through which most of our legal principles and rules evolved.
The criminal law, though now exclusively statutory for a variety
of important reasons, began as an evolving common law system,
for the death row status of women is speculative. Some authors suggest it is gender
bias that operates both to exclude the majority of women from consideration for
capital sentencing and the reason for their ascension to that status. Under the for-
mer theory, women are treated as weaker and less responsible for their own actions;
in the latter, they have traversed their expected roles so severely as to deserve such
punishment. See Joan W. Howarth, Deciding To Kill: Revealing the Gender in the
Task Handed to Capital Jurors, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 1346; Elizabeth Rapaport, Some
Questions About Gender and the Death Penalty, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 501
(1990): Jenny E. Carroll, Note, Images of Women and Capital Sentencing Among
Female Offenders: Exploring the Outer Limits of the Eighth Amendment and Articu-
lated Theories of Justice, 75 TEXAS L. REV. 1413 (1997),
239 See supra Part I.D.
240 See Katyal, supra note 15 (suggesting that judges may recommend particular
courses of action without mandate to engender a colloquy that enhances political
accountability and encourages judicial candor while serving the goals of federalism).
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changing to a statutory one only in the nineteenth century. 241
The problem for domestic violence is that, as an issue, it had min-
imal opportunity to fully develop through the common law as its
own area of the law. In fact, marital chastisement as formal legal
doctrine was also abandoned in the common law during the nine-
teenth century.242 The abandonment of formal laws concerning
the control of women did not precipitate revolutionary change in
the treatment of intimate violence. The shift from common law
to a statutory system may not have prevented substantive
change, but it likely forestalled it.243 Despite massive statutory
material proscribing crimes, there are still gaps in the laws,24 4 as
earlier demonstrated. The modern question in the criminal law
field is "whether judges can create (or discover) new crimes for
which to punish ... a new form of anti-social conduct not cov-
ered by the criminal code. 245 The doctrinal treatment of domes-
tic crimes is one of those gaps.
IV
FINDING ALTERNATIVES
Not having an alternative model to examine, nor a concrete
vision for a new system, it is not clear whether criminal courts,
civil courts, or some special hybrid of the two should take on the
task of developing new canons for domestic crimes. 246 Which-
241 LA FAVE & ScoTr, supra note 15, § 2.1(c), at 92. Reform of common law
systems to statutory ones by all fifty states was not complete in the ninteenth cen-
tury. The approval of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code was a signifi-
cant influence in organizing state codes. Id. § 1.1(b), at 4-8.
242 See Siegel, supra note 10, at 2121-41; see also DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note
32, at 48-74.
243 Since each of the 50 states abandoned coverture and chastisement on different
dates, as well as did each change to a statutory criminal law system at different
times, broad reference to the nineteenth century is necessary. The closeness in time
of these change is nonetheless significant as they both, independently and in tandem,
may have had an impact on the development of law as it affects women, particularly
in the area of domestic violence.
244 See LA FAVE & Sco-r, supra note 15, § 2.1(a), at 89-90.
245 Id. § 2.1(a), at 89.
246 See Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies To Achieve
Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law
Distinciton, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325 (1991) (suggesting there need not be distinctions
in civil and criminal penalties in the operation of our justice system, specifically cit-
ing civil protection orders as an example); see also Richard A. Epstein, The Tort!
Crime Distinction: A Generation Later, 76 B.U.L. REV. 1, 4 (1996) ("[M]y current
view is that we should think about legal rules in terms of the incentives they create
for individual conduct, be they for good or ill.").
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ever courts deal with issues of family violence, they must take
seriously the obligation to write the stories of domestic violence;
to create the canons and precedents that are specifically tailored
to this area. The judiciary needs to create meaning, favoring sub-
stance over form, context over abstraction and individuals over
theory. They should strive to use norms appropriate to the situa-
tion and to find solutions. The judiciary should deal with the fac-
tors and indicia of violence before it reaches its extremes. The
first step for the courts is acknowledging that relationship vio-
lence occurs in order to acquire and maintain a particular power
balance within the relationship. The court is in a unique position
to resituate the power hierarchies through their authority and
through their ability to make what is "private," public.
The courts have a ready resource in understanding what to
write and how to resituate power hierarchies, a resource that
heretofore has been substantially ignored. If the state is to repli-
cate the family,247 why not explore the strategies successfully
used by women who end the violence within their families?248
These women's communities have created an alternative nomos
of survival, a form of jurisgeneration. 249 Part of the silence per-
petuated by the judiciary are the stories about the families that
find a way to end the violence and stay together, with or without
the assistance of the courts, using their own strategies to compel
desistance. These success stories are ignored as we focus on the
stories of escalated violence and murder.2  While the courts
have made real efforts to recognize reforms to address the issues
of domestic violence, they have nonetheless continued to be
jurispathic in that they use law and a system not designed to deal
247 See PATEMAN, supra note 5.
248 "If the woman succeeds in continuing the relationship without further vio-
lence-if he does not hurt her again-no one will know it." Women's Lives, supra
note 29, at 76. "Continuing the relationship may therefore be part of a pattern of
resistance to violence on the part of the woman." Id. at 73; see also Elizabeth M.
Schneider, Feminism and The False Dichotomy of Victimization and Agency, 38
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 387 (1993). As Mahoney points out, we do not necessarily ex-
pect a relationship to end for an infidelity or other breaches of trust, or hurtful
indiscretions. Women's Lives, supra note 29:
[If] she tries to change his behavior-tells him to stop, seeks counseling,
and extracts assurances from him-and later he is unfaithful again, friends
and family will probably comfort her: Well, you tried to work it out. If he
hits her, however, and violates his promise to stop, people will ask: Why
didn't you leave?
249 See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
250 See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
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with family abuse, and do not fully recognize the strategies devel-
oped by these women's communities. If new canons were per-
mitted to develop, solely for dealing with issues of domestic
violence, courts could use and mimic the strategies used to suc-
cessfully end violence without destroying relationships. This is
important because in most instances these means for ending pri-
vate violence are counterintuitive for the criminal justice system.
The strategies found to be successful for the victims of domes-
tic violence include, but are not limited to, three specific strate-
gies.2 51 First, an effective strategy is social disclosure, the most
literal form of public narrative, or what is referred to in this Arti-
cle as making the private, public. This includes disclosure to em-
ployers, neighbors, relatives, friends and others important in the
life of the batterer. In other words, finding actions to make the
private violence a public matter. Courts have the ability to use
this strategy, first by writing complete stories of the violence into
the public record with some strong form of condemnation, and
second through the use of appropriate punishment that makes
the perpetrators' actions more public. This is consistent with re-
cent emerging criminal law literature regarding alternative sanc-
tions 252  Though it may be considered inhumane to bring back
251 See Fagan, supra note 14, at 380-91. Another study identifies self-help strate-
gies employed by victims to end the violence and may be considered a means of self-
preservation. They include calling the police, seeking professional counseling, enter-
ing a shelter for battered women, some form of passive resistance to minimize her
own injuries, leaving home for good and seeking a divorce, physically fighting back,
and finding a way to have the man promise to end the violence. See LEE H.
BOWKER, BEATING WIFE BEATING 9 (1983) (using a detailed and extensive survey
of Milwaukee couples who experienced wife-beating and then found a way to end
it).
252 See, e.g., Development in Law: Alternatives to Incarceration, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 1875 (1998) [hereinafter Development] (assessing the possibilities for experi-
mentation with alternative sanctions); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanc-
tions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 630-52 (discussing how shaming practices,
which unambiguously convey moral condemnation, can fashion politically accepta-
ble alternative sanctions as effective deterrents). But see Toni M. Massaro, Shame,
Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880 (1991) (arguing that
because criminal offenders do not fear social disapproval, shaming techniques will
not likely work); James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanc-
tions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055, 1088 (1998) (arguing that shame sanctions are a depriva-
tion of dignity and "involve a dangerous willingness, on the part of the government,
to delegate part of its enforcement power to a fickle and uncontrolled general
populace.").
A variety of constitutional challenges are possible with "shaming" sanctions, in-
cluding free speech, freedom of religion, due process, right against self-incrimina-
tion, cruel and unusual punishment, and equal protection. These challenges have
[Vol. 78, 1999]
Mirrored Silence
253 hsbethe pillory in the public square, it has been known to be effec-
tive in altering conduct. Something less severe and accessible to
the courts as one component in ending private violence would be
publication. For example, the names of those convicted of drunk
driving are often published in the local newspapers as a form of
public sanction. This has also been a form of sanction for long-
term child-support delinquents. Names of people convicted of
solicitation are also published in some jurisdictions. 4 Other pos-
sibilities for public shaming include sign posts, sandwich boards,
or bumper stickers. 5  Public apology has specifically been em-
ployed as a form of public sanction against a wife beater. 6
Many batterers continue their abusive behavior because of rat-
ification by their peers, often in the form of silent assent. Public
condemnation may be an effective component in ending violence
by refusing to allow it to remain private. However, we must en-
sure that alternative public punishments not be arbitrary, but re-
lated to the offense, its prevention, and avoidance of recurrence.
To that end, alternative public sanctions must not be considered
panacea lest these sanctions turn into "slaps on the wrist" that
exacerbate the situation. In addition, the "public" in this in-
stance should not become yet another means of creating the
"other." It is critical that public forms of punishment are not
disproportionately levied against minorities. 7
Alternatives to incarceration may serve additional benefits.
had very limited success in cases of alternative sanctions thus far. See Development,
supra at 1950-54.
253 For a discussion of the more interesting punishments of colonialism, see ALICE
MORSE EARLE, CURIOUS PUNISHMENTS OF BYGONE DAYS (1896). Colonial punish-
ments tended to be public and focused on shaming. The American criminal justice
system's focus on incarceration is a fairly recent phenomenon which might be con-
sidered unique both in comparison to other eras and to the criminal justice systems
of other countries. See Development, supra note 252, at 1870.
254 Even more extreme is "John TV" in Kansas City where photographs and per-
sonal information about those arrested for prostitution offenses is publicized on the
local government channel. See Matt Campbell, 'John TV' Gets Started, KANSAS
CITY STAR, May 16, 1997, at Al; see also Kahan, supra note 252, at 632 (discussing
examples of publication); Timothy Heider, 'John TV' Credited with Cutting Crimes.
KANSAS CITY STAR, July 18, 1997, at C12; Mark Morris, 'John TV' Shows Signs of
Success: Arrests Dropped 49 Percent in the Month Following the Program, KANSAS
CITY STAR, July 18, 1997, at C8.
255 See Development, supra note 252, at 1949.
256 See Paul Sperry, Judge Ted Poe: Throwing the Book-And Bible-At Texas'
Criminals, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Dec. 3, 1996, at Al (noting that Judge Poe de-
manded that a batterer apologize to his wife on the steps of City Hall).
257 Cf. supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
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Incarceration of the primary bread-winner often levies harsh
punishments on the entire family and exacerbates the tensions
that may contribute to the violence. a 8 Monetary fines, while
likely leaving the family source of income continuous, still have
the potential to add strain to the situation, exacerbating the vio-
lence. In addition, sanctions perceived to be less severe and une-
quivocal than incarceration may be more easily given by
judges.259 Nonetheless, incarceration should not be eliminated as
sanction in appropriate situations. Especially with recidivist
abusers and situations of high levels of violence, incarceration, in
conjunction with appropriate victim protection strategies, may be
the best option.260
The second effective strategy is self-defense efforts. These ef-
forts might include hiding, taking shelter or physical self-defense.
Hiding works if the victim has a social network where she is per-
mitted to hide and is protected. Unfortunately, not everyone has
this option, either for lack of family and friends, or because of
complicitous conduct on the part of family and friends.261 The
availability of shelters has been and continues to be incredibly
important for the survival of victims of abuse. Shelters are most
effective in that they allow the victim to take control of her own
fate. Nonetheless, there may be instances when it is paramount
that the courts take a greater role in the protection of victims.
The justice system has the ability to hide and protect victims, es-
pecially those pursued by the most violent. This option is sel-
dom, if ever, used. This seems ironic considering we routinely
hide, relocate, and even change the identity of known criminals
to protect them from the violence of their mob "families.,
262
A third effective strategy is intervention. Intervention may be
by a social agency, like a counseling center, religious institution,
258 For these reasons, many victims of abuse think twice before pressing charges
against their abusers.
259 Parceling out sanctions is no enviable task for judges, particularly where the
punishment does not fully fit the offense. But cf Kahan, supra note 252, at 592
(suggesting that alternative sanctions have not been accepted because they are not
perceived to be severe enough).
260 See Fagan, supra note 14, at 394.
261 Isolation of victims of abuse is instituted by the batterer and perpetuated by
ideologies of denial held within the community that tend to blame the victim for the
abusive situation. See Separation, supra note 29, at 10-19.
262 See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, §§ 501-04, 84
Stat. 922, 933-34, repealed by Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-473, §§ 1207-10, 98 Stat. 1837, 2153-63. This Act is often referred to as the
"Witness Protection Program."
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or community service organization, or it may be by a criminal
justice agency, including the police or the courts, as long as this
intervention includes a real formal sanction or the threat of
one. 263 It may be counterintuitive, but harsher sanctions earlier
in the pattern of violence are more effective in ending violence
than the usual criminal response after an escalation of violence.
The hard question is what should these sanctions entail such that
the justice system ends the violence without destroying the rela-
tionship and family. These questions are ones about which the
courts should experiment and write to find answers.
To reach this end, courts should use a dual approach. Criminal
justice interventions should be aggressive and early when the vio-
lence is at a stage of minimal severity, meaning those with little
prior history of violence or prior injuries.2 " Because most bat-
terers do not voluntarily seek help,265 the courts can have a tre-
mendous influence, first through public sanction, but also by
directing batterers to such resources.266 These are the cases
where there is the greatest chance of eradicating the violence
from the relationship. Interventions should, of course, be swift
where the violence has escalated in the relationship. There is a
theory that intervention by the judicial system is bad in situations
of domestic abuse because such interventions have the potential
to anger the batterer who will then retaliate against the victim
with increased violence. However, studies have found this to be
the case primarily in instances where the violence has already
been prolonged and is already at a severe level of violence.267
The primary focus in these cases must be the safety of the victim.
263 Sanctions must be meaningful to the defendant and constitute punishment that
is more than illusory. See Fagan, supra note 14, at 386 (suggesting that probation
supervision with minimal contact is an insufficient sanction).
264 Fagan, supra note 14, at 383-86 (noting that criminal justice interventions re-
sulted in less frequent and severe violence for the less severe cases and that "[a]
weak sentence may actually neutralize the deterrent effects of legal sanctions for
spousal violence, particularly for offenders with lengthy criminal histories.").
26 Most of the husbands [in the Milwaukee study] did not voluntarily seek
help. They were pressured into it by their wives, often with help from
others. The fact that a husband enters treatment may reflect a change in
the marital power balance as much as it does his willingness to receive
treatment.
BOWKER, supra note 251, at 108.
266 Fagan, supra note 14, at 407-10 (discussing personal costs to the batterer).
267 Id. at 394; see also SONKIN ET AL., supra note 4 (assessing the various methods
for treating male batterers).
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In other words, separating the parties without ensuring protec-
tion against reprisals is unacceptable.
Recent evidence from studies of legal and social sanctions for
spouse abuse suggests that desistance in less chronic or serious
(i.e., injurious) cases may occur in response to legal sanctions.
However, legal sanctions for more serious cases were less ef-
fective and possibly led to escalations in violence. Evidence
from theoretical samples of former victims who had ended
spouse abuse in their relationships suggests that both legal and
social sanctions were important factors in ending violence.
Strategies varied, depending on the relationship history and
on the assailants' backgrounds. Once again, desistance in se-
vere cases with more injurious and protracted violence was
more difficult, regardless of the nature or strength of the sanc-
tion. This suggests that habitual or systematic violence may be
more amenable to different desistance strategies than less seri-
ous cases.
268
Nuanced solutions and combined cooperative efforts will be
most effective in eliminating the violence. That is, solutions par-
ticular to each situation must be employed to be most effective.
Vigilance concerning the level of violence in the relationship is
crucial. In addition, courts, while being an important and inte-
gral part of potential solutions, cannot be the only solution. Not
only should courts be part of varied solutions, but they them-
selves should draw upon a variety of solutions according to the
specific context.
A new approach is need which focuses on the protection of the
victim, not merely deterrence and punishment. It needs to emu-
late and employ modes of desistance already found to be effec-
tive by victims. It might use public space to shame and counter
the deviance model by ending silence. It needs to create a system
(and canons) to deal with an area that is not easily dealt with in
either criminal or civil courts.
CONCLUSION
If our practice is rooted in feminist theory, then the realiza-
tion that this model will not eradicate battering should neither
surprise nor discourage us. Battering is rooted in a culture of
domination, a culture that does not celebrate our differences
in race, age, sexual preference, physical and mental abilities,
and gender, but instead uses these differences to exploit and
dehumanize. Surely we cannot expect that sending out the po-
lice to pluck batterers from their homes, using the courts to
268 Fagan. supra note 14, at 394.
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make all sorts of nasty threats of doom, and rounding up coun-
selors and teachers to convince men to stop beating their part-
ners will end violence against women.
26 9
Ideally, we would reformulate and introduce new paradigms to
determine social functions and hierarchies. Unfortunately, a
revolution of that sort is unrealistic. The more modest proposals
in this Article are optimistic. The difficulty is mostly caused by a
history of silence. In addition, the challenge to the judiciary to
be the moving force in change, when it has an investment in the
current structure, is daunting. Even those least invested in the
current structures are still products of them.
This Article began with a silenced story, Person, that need not
have been. Its foil, Kheyfets, provides an approach that may
point us in a better direction. Most importantly, Kheyfets gives
voice to the victim of the crime and others who have encountered
similar situations. It does not allow the separation of the facts
from the application of the law, thereby demonstrating the injus-
tice and inadequacy of current law and making a moral commit-
ment to substantively interpret the law for a just result. Had the
discussion in Kheyfets been permitted the force of law, it would
have affected the patriarchal power dynamic that allowed for the
accession of violence. The full set of facts, demonstrating the
fairness in the situation, sends a clear message to all actors in the
chain of justice, from the victim and abuser, through the police
and social workers, to the prosecutors and court personnel, and
eventually to the legislature.
More effective ways of eliminating private violence can be
found. This will be most effective if we fashion laws, remedies
and other solutions specifically tailored to this area, rather than
expecting solutions created for other situations to do the job.
Narrative is a powerful means of changing and reforming the law
within the legal system, as opposed to from without. The judici-
ary has the power and authority to use story as a means of re-
creating norms, to alter our concept of violence in society, and to
affect the power structure that permits and conditions private
violence.
Certainly the problems associated with eradicating violence in
the home are immense. No one approach or organization can
269 Ellen Pence & Melanie Shepard, Integrating Feminist Theory and Practice: The
Challenge of the Battered Women's Movement, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra
note 14, at 282.
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complete the task alone. The judiciary can play a greater role,
perhaps even one of leadership. In the least, the judiciary needs
to ensure that it is not part of the problem.
